FY 14 Force Management Program (RIF, VSP, TERA)

[olevelo]

It's interesting that every single person I've talked from the O-7 level all the way down to the uninitiated have the exact same reaction as you. Which really does bring into question what this board was looking for.

To answer your question, it's about a million dollars to send us through TPS, not including everything it took to get us to that point, as well as the follow on quals or requals we end up with.

[pawnman]

We lost three 12Bs, including an evaluator with 6 deployments. This in an ops group that struggles to fill all the 12B billets.

[MSCguy]

It's interesting that every single person I've talked from the O-7 level all the way down to the uninitiated have the exact same reaction as you. Which really does bring into question what this board was looking for.

To answer your question, it's about a million dollars to send us through TPS, not including everything it took to get us to that point, as well as the follow on quals or requals we end up with.

Maybe you highlighted yourself as not being a team player because you never planned a holiday party or change of command, or spearheaded the CFC drive.

[BONE WSO]

Please bear with me while I tell a little story highlighting what the AF truly values. Hint: It doesn't involve flying or deploying.

When I was a Lt in a B-1 Operations Squadron, I was a scheduler and a line WSO. All I did was fly a lot and bust my ass in scheduling. I received very good strats and excellent OPRs. I never once did a holiday party or any other such BS.

When I got to the FTU, I continued that same routine of flying a lot and being great at my ground job. When I received my first OPR, it was terrible. I was furious. I asked my rater why it was so bad and he said it was because I never did any volunteer work. Being the smart-ass that I am, I told him I would volunteer for every single thing that came across my email for the next year and pay little attention to flying, and that is exactly what I did. I really just wanted to prove a point at how ridiculous the AF is.

I ran the CFC for the entire wing. I organized, no shit, an ice cream social at the WG/CC's house. I led 30 airmen to paint the B-1 at the gate. I organized a flight line social for the city of Abilene. I led the LtGen Rand visit. I led a tour for Sen Cornyn. I even got myself elected as the VP of the CGOC for a few months. Because I was doing all this, I never flew or sat SOF. I only worked on this BS. I flew only 12 times in 2011 but the strange thing was that nobody cared, exactly as I expected. Not once did anybody question why I was never flying with students or doing my job. I logged maybe 50 hours the entire year as an FTU instructor. I constantly received praise from the SQ/CC and WG/CC about everything I was doing and got all #1 or #2 strats. I won CGO of the Year for the squadron and the Ops Group.

The next year I went back to my normal self, and my average OPRs. This example taught me that there is no incentive to be good at your job, or even care about flying. The guys that are logging the most deployments and flying the most with students get shit on careerwise and the guys that shirk flying so that they can go plan the christmas party are getting school slots and becoming commanders. This creates a lot of resentment from the guys actually out there doing the work of the squadron and severely lowers morale. The 3 guys they RIFed in the B-1 were perfect examples of guys that were busting their asses get the job done and they get the boot.

Refusing to play this game, I took the VSP a couple months ago and now love life in the ANG. For the young guys, if you intend the make the AF a career, you have to play the game at least a little bit, not to the extreme I did, but you have to lead some stuff around the group and the wing. I have seen more than a few guys not get promoted, and now guys getting RIFed for being very good at their jobs, but not volunteering to do stuff outside the squadron.

Edited November 22, 2014 by BONE WSO

[spaw2001]

Please bear with me while I tell a little story highlighting what the AF truly values. Hint: It doesn't involve flying or deploying.

When I was a Lt in a B-1 Operations Squadron, I was a scheduler and a line WSO. All I did was fly a lot and bust my ass in scheduling. I received very good strats and excellent OPRs. I never once did a holiday party or any other such BS.

When I got to the FTU, I continued that same routine of flying a lot and being great at my ground job. When I received my first OPR, it was terrible. I was furious. I asked my rater why it was so bad and he said it was because I never did any volunteer work. Being the smart-ass that I am, I told him I would volunteer for every single thing that came across my email for the next year and pay little attention to flying, and that is exactly what I did. I really just wanted to prove a point at how ridiculous the AF is.

I ran the CFC for the entire wing. I organized, no shit, an ice cream social at the WG/CC's house. I led 30 airmen to paint the B-1 at the gate. I organized a flight line social for the city of Abilene. I led the LtGen Rand visit. I led a tour for Sen Cornyn. I even got myself elected as the VP of the CGOC for a few months. Because I was doing all this, I never flew or sat SOF. I only worked on this BS. I flew only 12 times in 2011 but the strange thing was that nobody cared, exactly as I expected. Not once did anybody question why I was never flying with students or doing my job. I logged maybe 50 hours the entire year as an FTU instructor. I constantly received praise from the SQ/CC and WG/CC about everything I was doing and got all #1 or #2 strats. I won CGO of the Year for the squadron and the Ops Group.

The next year I went back to my normal self, and my average OPRs. This example taught me that there is no incentive to be good at your job, or even care about flying. The guys that are logging the most deployments and flying the most with students get shit on careerwise and the guys that shirk flying so that they can go plan the christmas party are getting school slots and becoming commanders. This creates a lot of resentment from the guys actually out there doing the work of the squadron and severely lowers morale. The 3 guys they RIFed in the B-1 were perfect examples of guys that were busting their asses get the job done and they get the boot.

Refusing to play this game, I took the VSP a couple months ago and now love life in the ANG.

This argument is getting tired. Many of the "heralded line pilots" you suggest typically lack balance. Yeah they are good at flying but when it came to office work, personal development, etc... they were shitty. The fastest of burners had balance. Many are patches who are extremely proficient at flying and also know how to play the game and make their leadership look good. Yes, there are some careerists that make a living planning bbqs. On the otherside, there are some line pilots who get screwed. Those are the outliers. The mean of successful officers on the career bell curve are typically dudes that are good at flying but also bring value to the unit on the admin side. Stop using the bell curve tails to generate base ops red meat. Generals and even squadron commanders in today's air force are not paid to fly.

[BONE WSO]

This argument is getting tired. Many of the "heralded line pilots" you suggest typically lack balance. Yeah they are good at flying but when it came to office work, personal development, etc... they were shitty. The fastest of burners had balance. Many are patches who are extremely proficient at flying and also know how to play the game and make their leadership look good. Yes, there are some careerists that make a living planning bbqs. On the otherside, there are some line pilots who get screwed. Those are the outliers. The mean of successful officers on the career bell curve are typically dudes that are good at flying but also bring value to the unit on the admin side. Stop using the bell curve tails to generate base ops red meat. Generals and even squadron commanders in today's air force are not paid to fly.

Yes, this is an extreme example. The point I wanted to get across, and I added a few more sentences to the end of my post to make it clear, is that you must lead at least some events outside the squadron if you want to stay in and progress. When you are a young guy, nobody tells you that. At least nobody told me that. I thought being excellent at your job was all you needed. I was in 7 years before I figured that out.

[panchbarnes]

From experience in the non-rated ops world, the "successful" careerists that climbed the ladder by planning parties are marginal at their real job. Many of them are now in leadership roles (Flt/Sq/Staff lvls) and are supposed to be considered SMEs because they checked a box from a certain assignment in the past (fake breadth of experience). Their #1 strats from previous assignments are probably the results of volunteer work, PME, and AAD. I might trust these people to "manage" a small unit but I would not rely on them if I needed to plan or a support a no-kidding mission. Their lack of real job knowledge at the tactical, operational and strategic level is scary. Also since they lacked real job knowledge, they are unable to mentor, guide, and train the junior Airmen in their shop except to tell them to check the boxes and volunteer like they once did. So this cycle keeps going and eventually the career field ends up with mostly careerists and not so many real experts.

Yes I agree we want our leaders to be good at admin and job skills, but right now the balance is way out of whack.

I personally would rather follow a senior leader who has been there and done that during an operation then someone who mostly excels at managing.

Edited November 22, 2014 by PanchBarnes

[magnetfreezer]

This argument is getting tired. Many of the "heralded line pilots" you suggest typically lack balance. Yeah they are good at flying but when it came to office work, personal development, etc... they were shitty. The fastest of burners had balance. Many are patches who are extremely proficient at flying and also know how to play the game and make their leadership look good. Yes, there are some careerists that make a living planning bbqs. On the otherside, there are some line pilots who get screwed. Those are the outliers. The mean of successful officers on the career bell curve are typically dudes that are good at flying but also bring value to the unit on the admin side. Stop using the bell curve tails to generate base ops red meat. Generals and even squadron commanders in today's air force are not paid to fly.

The "outside your jet" stuff should still be your job though. Be a good scheduler and add value to your squadron, volunteer at the soup kitchen for your own good feelings only.

[joe1234]

Look, you can be the career guy, get the strats and awards, and have the accolades from leadership, and dodge deployments, and that's completely okay. Sure you won't have the respect of your peers as an aviator, but you will outrank them, so I guess that doesn't matter.

Or, you can be the guy who only cares about flying, and busts your ass trying to teach/guide the next generation of flyers. You can be the guy people look to when it comes to difficult questions about flying or doing the mission. Sure you'll probably get passed over, won't get awards, get the shit deployed out of you, and won't be loved by leadership, but at least you'll have the respect of your peers as an aviator, and the respect and thanks of your students for your guidance.

I made a decision to be the second one, because I can live with being passed over and RIF'd. I couldn't live with being a careerist.

Edited November 23, 2014 by joe1234

[Herk Driver]

Look, you can be the career guy, get the strats and awards, and have the accolades from leadership, and dodge deployments, and that's completely okay. Sure you won't have the respect of your peers as an aviator, but you will outrank them, so I guess that doesn't matter.

Or, you can be the guy who only cares about flying, and busts your ass trying to teach/guide the next generation of flyers. You can be the guy people look to when it comes to difficult questions about flying or doing the mission. Sure you'll probably get passed over, won't get awards, get the shit deployed out of you, and won't be loved by leadership, but at least you'll have the respect of your peers as an aviator, and the respect and thanks of your students for your guidance.

I made a decision to be the second one, because I can live with being passed over and RIF'd. I couldn't live with being a careerist.

Great example of a false dilemma.

[tac airlifter]

Concur with HD, it's not necessarily one or the other. Sometimes it is, and some MAJCOMs are worse than others (AMC vs AFSOC) when it comes to mission prioritization. But you're wrong to say strats go only to non-mission hackers.

[pawnman]

Great example of a false dilemma.

Not based on the people I've seen recognized and promoted, versus the people I've seen RIF'd or passed over.

[BONE WSO]

I would not agree that it is either one or the other. It is not that black and white. Here is how I break out how the AF evaluates people, at least in the B-1 community. The guys/girls that are in either group #1 or group #2 are the ones that get promoted and have above average careers.The people from these two groups form the leadership of our community.

1) WIC grads, OG & Wing Exec

2) Non-WIC grads that are good at primary job and still get the admin stuff done. (CFC, Party Planner, etc)

3) Guys that are great at primary job of flying, SOF, etc, but don't lead anything

4) Guys that are average at their jobs and do nothing extra

I never see the guys in group #1 planning Christmas parties or doing CFC, etc... They don't have to. They are considered the tactical experts or have high visiblity Exec jobs that keep them very busy. As long as they work hard at their primary jobs, they will progress and be near the top of the strat pile. If they can be the squadron patch and also lead projects around the base, they will be considered a superstar.

If you are in group #2, you must be good at your job, attaining at least some proficiency (instructor, evaluator, not a dirtbag) but you don't have to be the absolute best in the squadron either. As long as you meet this bar, you are good. Be good at your job and knock out a lot of admin stuff to help your CC and make the squadron look good.

The mistake many guys make, that don't want to go to WIC, is to try to be in group #3. It is not enough to be the very best pilot or WSO in the community. You will not be rewarded for knowing more than every single person in the squadron, or taking that extra deployment. When these people don't get promoted or get RIFed, everyone is shocked because they are seen as the backbone of the squadron, but this is not what the AF rewards or promotes. After you become good at your job, don't spend all your effort on being the best, you should back off a bit and aim to be in group #2 by volunteering to lead some projects. Unless you are a rockstar and can be the very best at your job and still able to knock out important taskers for the boss.

Guys that are in group #4 usually will have a below average career and may not get promoted or may get RIFed.

I'm sure I will take some spears from others for this but this is based on my experience in the B-1 community. I realize that some guys will say this is BS and that you should strive to be the absolute best at your job and to hell with everything else (group #3), like Joe1234. This is valid, but if you want to stay in for a career, it will be very difficult for you to go this route and you probably won't be the CC.

Edited November 23, 2014 by BONE WSO

[Chuck17]

^^ That's closer to the mark than the absolute one-or-the-other stance previously mentioned.

We all have choices. Own yours.

Chuck

[zmoney]

AF Times has an article breaking down some of the FY14/FY15 cuts:

http://militari.ly/1zRmrId

"On the officer side, the cuts fell most heavily — both proportionally and numerically — on 11M mobility pilots. When the force management program began last December, the Air Force had 4,399 mobility pilots in its ranks, which equated to 6.9 percent of the officer force. But the Air Force cut 386 mobility pilots — mostly through voluntary separation pay — which amounted to 14.2 percent of the officer cuts. Cox said that the Air Force decided it could get its strategic airlift job done by lowering the crew ratio for active duty mobility pilots. For example, Cox said, the Air Force in the past has required each C-17 to have three crews. That crew ratio is being lowered to two crews per aircraft."

[FUSEPLUG]

"Cox said that the Air Force decided it could get its strategic airlift job done by lowering the crew ratio for active duty mobility pilots. For example, Cox said, the Air Force in the past has required each C-17 to have three crews. That crew ratio is being lowered to two crews per aircraft."

Please. The AF decided shit. They provided near blanket VSP approval to 11M's in the 2004 to 2008 year groups which (IMHO) equated a roll of the dice. AFPC was obviously overwhelmed by the response to the VSP, hence the delays. I like the way Cox spins it to look like it was a calculated move by big blue.

[tunes]

They provided near blanket VSP approval to 11M's in the 2004 to 2008 year groups

zero complaints here

[Dupe]

AF Times has an article breaking down some of the FY14/FY15 cuts:

http://militari.ly/1zRmrId

It's shocking how much work went into slashing the force by..... drumroll.... about 7%.

We could have just tinkered with promotion rates and let the problem solve itself.

[Tonka]

We could have just tinkered with promotion rates and let the problem solve itself.

Well that "problem" equates to people's lives, careers, and families. I'm sure that is not what you meant, but let's not miss the bigger picture... The military person (99% of them) is (are) not to blame, yet is feeling a dramatic share of the pain because we can't or won't cut the programs we need to.

How about we pretend like we care about physical fitness, and physically-fitness-assess people right on out the door. Why don't we just not offer continuation like we've always done, but show that we care by releasing a memo suggesting it's possible.

It isn't fair to keep changing the requirements to keep your job because we can't manage personnel numbers farther out then the next VML.

[Dupe]

Well that "problem" equates to people's lives, careers, and families. I'm sure that is not what you meant, but let's not miss the bigger picture... The military person (99% of them) is (are) not to blame, yet is feeling a dramatic share of the pain because we can't or won't cut the programs we need to.

How about we pretend like we care about physical fitness, and physically-fitness-assess people right on out the door. Why don't we just not offer continuation like we've always done, but show that we care by releasing a memo suggesting it's possible.

It isn't fair to keep changing the requirements to keep your job because we can't manage personnel numbers farther out then the next VML.

The point I'm trying to make is that we went through significant churn just to cut 7%. You'd think with all the programs we rolled out, that we were trying to cut 20%-30% or more. I saw all these taken in total as a trim and not a hack at the end numbers.

[MooseAg03]

I'd like to hear from guys still in the C-17 squadrons about what this is doing for ops tempo. Where does our ability to surge during the next Haiti, Hurricane Sandy, or Japanese tsunami come from when we lowered our available crews by one third?

Also, second and third order effects...this higher ops tempo will more than likely drive more guys out in the future. If you drive guys into the ground, they will leave at the first opportunity. Haven't the last two rounds (3 if you go back to 2011) of VSP taught us anything?

[Fuzz]

I'd like to hear from guys still in the C-17 squadrons about what this is doing for ops tempo. Where does our ability to surge during the next Haiti, Hurricane Sandy, or Japanese tsunami come from when we lowered our available crews by one third?

Also, second and third order effects...this higher ops tempo will more than likely drive more guys out in the future. If you drive guys into the ground, they will leave at the first opportunity. Haven't the last two rounds (3 if you go back to 2011) of VSP taught us anything?

We've been short strung for a while, they can't upgrade guys fast enough to AC. We also lost a lot of knowledge and experience with several lead airdrop/IPs/EPs VSPing and the WIC guys getting pulled back to the schoohouse. I heard the other day the C-17 WPS lost almost 2/3rds of the cadre. Right now we have less than 5 WICs instructors for all of McChord and they all work at group or above jobs. I don't think a Haiti surge would be possible since we just don't have the bodies, not even looking at experience or crew quals.

[Chuck17]

We've been short strung for a while, they can't upgrade guys fast enough to AC. We also lost a lot of knowledge and experience with several lead airdrop/IPs/EPs VSPing and the WIC guys getting pulled back to the schoohouse. I heard the other day the C-17 WPS lost almost 2/3rds of the cadre. Right now we have less than 5 WICs instructors for all of McChord and they all work at group or above jobs.

The 57th lost a lot of dudes. Bloodbath is a good word. But not 2/3... Maybe pushing 1/2, maybe. Regardless, it hurts. The fact is that the C17 WO community will be 65% manned in the short term, 85% best case in the long.... meaning less dudes in Tier I jobs at the squadron... There are plenty of older guys making their ways up the ladder, but the younger dudes have a lot on their plates with little relief in sight.

I'd like to hear from guys still in the C-17 squadrons about what this is doing for ops tempo. Where does our ability to surge during the next Haiti, Hurricane Sandy, or Japanese tsunami come from when we lowered our available crews by one third?

Also, second and third order effects...this higher ops tempo will more than likely drive more guys out in the future. If you drive guys into the ground, they will leave at the first opportunity. Haven't the last two rounds (3 if you go back to 2011) of VSP taught us anything?

The institutional memory of the crew force is longer than that; for the bean counters not so much. This debacle rings echoes of the 2006 VSP nightmare that we never got over. So no, the USAF and the C17 community didnt learn a thing. You're right - It is a self licking ice cream cone of malaise. It creates more problems than it solves. But every community feels some drawdown pinch. It was inevitable. It's the new reality, but not just yet. The 10th and 17th aren't boarding up tomorrow. This will take til 2017 to complete. Personally I'd be more concerned about the transfer of iron to AFRC. It's not like the crew force does a lot of local flying as it is. The currency vs proficiency slight of hand has only just begun.

Chuck

Edited November 25, 2014 by Chuck17

[Disregard]

Get ready for more of this:

http://archive.airforcetimes.com/article/20131205/NEWS/312050023/Crew-inexperience-fatigue-led-C-17-runway-mishap

Crew inexperience, fatigue led to C-17 runway mishap

"Crew inexperience and fatigue helped cause a May 9 incident in which a C-17 landed 1,000 feet short of the runway at Dover Air Force Base, Del., an investigation has determined.

...

Things started to go wrong when the pilot became confused flying an instrument approach with a nonstandard glide path angle, the investigation found. The pilot tried to land at a standard 3-degree glidescope, but the glidescope for the runway at Dover is 2.5 degrees.

At an altitude of approximately 300 feet, the pilot made a series of corrections, pulling the nose up to “an unusual attitude” to correct his approach and bringing the engines to idle. Neither the pilot nor co-pilot realized the plane was slowing to an unsafe speed.

The pilot began making positive corrections at 175 feet. He initiated a go-around when he received a stall warning at 75 feet, but it was too late. The plane landed short of the runway, blowing out tires and damaging the landing gear and fuselage.

The entire incident lasted about 22 seconds — from the time the pilot came in at the wrong angle to when the plane hit the ground. An experienced pilot would have realized the plane was coming in at a wrong angle and made the appropriate correction or aborted the landing, but neither the pilot nor the co-pilot had landed at the shallower angle required for Dover, the report found.

The investigation found that the experience level at Charleston has been “steadily decreasing,” and that the 17th Airlift Squadron is undermanned in terms of both pilots and co-pilots.

Missionplanners failed to take into account the crew’s lack of experience, the investigation found."

[HossHarris]

It's a standard recovery technique, hike the nose up and chop power.

Works every time