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Do people actually learn stuff at PME like ACSC or AWC? SOS was an 8 week vacation from the CAF - I expected ACSC to just be a 12 month vacation with nebulous benefits.

Somewhat of a derail:

A bit of both. While the part-time banker's hours were a great sabbatical and chance to be with the family, there was a significant amount of material to read.

On the surface, they advertise that they want you to "think strategically, and solve the complex problems of the air force". And a lot of the international relations/military theory courses do teach you a huge amount that engineering type minds wouldn't necessarily be exposed to.

Realistically, they are bound by JPME curriculum and handcuffed by the AETC formal course mentality, grading rubrics and "approved" solutions.

Then, there are the near daily parade of stars wanting to give advice to an audience of Majors. Pros and cons abound...

Definitely learned a lot...Definitely wouldn't consider it the "Harvard of the South"

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15 hours ago, Jaded said:

Do people actually learn stuff at PME like ACSC or AWC? SOS was an 8 week vacation from the CAF - I expected ACSC to just be a 12 month vacation with nebulous benefits.

Anytime I can talk to another AFSC in I learn a lot more about the AF than my Cyber stuff.  It's helped me execute my mission better because I now know how it impacts the other parts of the base/mission.  Even better if it's in a relaxed/low-threat environment.

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Should we consider talking with someone from another AFSC "PME"? I don't discount the value in those interactions, but doesn't that speak to ACSC's lack of effectiveness from an academic point of view if that's the best thing you get out of the course?

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So far, no one at ACSC can explain to me exactly what I'm supposed to get out of it beyond a general sense that eduction helps build problem solvers.  We have the most educated force in history and we're losing wars, so I'm not sure education = problem solving.  I won't thread derail anymore than simply saying that ACSC is not worth a year of my time off the line while ops units are short on experienced pilots and the nation is losing wars.  

 

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I wonder why Air University doesn't do an end-of-career PME survey to figure out what our PME needs to be.  I would think if you asked every retiring O-5 and above about their PME experience throughout their career, what they needed versus what PME taught them, etc., AU would get a lot of useful feedback. 

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I wonder why Air University doesn't do an end-of-career PME survey to figure out what our PME needs to be.  I would think if you asked every retiring O-5 and above about their PME experience throughout their career, what they needed versus what PME taught them, etc., AU would get a lot of useful feedback. 

Most of AU probably isn't interested in improving.

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I wonder why Air University doesn't do an end-of-career PME survey to figure out what our PME needs to be.  I would think if you asked every retiring O-5 and above about their PME experience throughout their career, what they needed versus what PME taught them, etc., AU would get a lot of useful feedback. 

Most of AU probably isn't interested in improving.

Probably true but take a close look at some of the things taking place at AU through "transformation." Many of the top positions have lowered ranks as the top guy. Many of the top "academics" have been moved to different positions and the Spaatz Center was just eliminated from what I understand. Maybe this is all much ado about nothing, but it looks like Gen Kwast is making some decisions that are going to impact the future there, one way or another.

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46 minutes ago, Dupe said:

 

I argue that we're being directed to go fight unwinnable wars.

 

We're losing the very best that we can.

What do you mean by "unwinnable?"

and we certainly aren't doing our best.  How could you even say that?  Are we hitting every target we could?  Are we streamlining the laborious target approval process?  Are we capitalizing on every TST?  Regardless of the viability of our strategic objectives, we simply aren't doing our best to accomplish them.  If we were doing our best we wouldn't be forcing experienced line operators into school and staff while leaving the units executing missions short handed.   

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I think he means: we're using a $138 million jet to drop a $1 million bomb on a  $20 tent killing a couple warriors for Jihad at a time but scattering all the rest of the cockroaches and creating ten more Twitter Jihadis in the process.

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4 hours ago, tac airlifter said:

Regardless of the viability of our strategic objectives, we simply aren't doing our best to accomplish them.  

Therein lies the problem: if the policy aims are not attainable or reasonable, then no level of effort will secure the ends.  Forcing some of those experienced operators into school and staff may actually be the remedy for the ills of the AF.  People with firsthand experience working to influence strategy...seems valid.

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1 hour ago, Homestar said:

I think he means: we're using a $138 million jet to drop a $1 million bomb on a  $20 tent killing a couple warriors for Jihad at a time but scattering all the rest of the cockroaches and creating ten more Twitter Jihadis in the process.

We are the ones choosing to use 138$ mil jet to do what simpler & cheaper platforms can do.  And we're hitting them in small numbers because we chose not to strike when they were in massive convoys in open territory.  So I copy that frustration, but that isn't an "unwinnable war," that is us making stupid decisions about how to wage war.

21 minutes ago, Muscle2002 said:

Therein lies the problem: if the policy aims are not attainable or reasonable, then no level of effort will secure the ends.  Forcing some of those experienced operators into school and staff may actually be the remedy for the ills of the AF.  People with firsthand experience working to influence strategy...seems valid.

I don't disagree, but it's presumptuous to assume the policy end is unattainable before we even give it our best shot.  And giving it our best shot means, partly, keeping our best talent in the fight.  Do you think that experienced school grad will influence national security strategy from a position on a staff?  We're already sending credible guys to staff but our approach to VEOs hasn't been changing.

 

I get where each of you are coming from, but we're all products of our experiences to some extent.  And my experience is constantly working for commanders downrange who are unwilling to change their approach but repeatedly disappointed in the outcomes.  This isn't an "I'm right & you're wrong" discussion and I appreciate your views.  Big picture all I'm saying is: after 14 years of failing to produce desired results from combat, and doing so with the most educated force in history, we might entertain the potential that something about our officer production formula is wrong since we seem to be producing people who do the same things.  And those things aren't working.  And if those things can't work.... Why aren't we producing people who have the balls to say that at expense to their career?

Also I don't want to go to staff!

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17 minutes ago, tac airlifter said:

We are the ones choosing to use 138$ mil jet to do what simpler & cheaper platforms can do.  And we're hitting them in small numbers because we chose not to strike when they were in massive convoys in open territory.  So I copy that frustration, but that isn't an "unwinnable war," that is us making stupid decisions about how to wage war.

I don't disagree, but it's presumptuous to assume the policy end is unattainable before we even give it our best shot.  And giving it our best shot means, partly, keeping our best talent in the fight.  Do you think that experienced school grad will influence national security strategy from a position on a staff?  We're already sending credible guys to staff but our approach to VEOs hasn't been changing.

 

I get where each of you are coming from, but we're all products of our experiences to some extent.  And my experience is constantly working for commanders downrange who are unwilling to change their approach but repeatedly disappointed in the outcomes.  This isn't an "I'm right & you're wrong" discussion and I appreciate your views.  Big picture all I'm saying is: after 14 years of failing to produce desired results from combat, and doing so with the most educated force in history, we might entertain the potential that something about our officer production formula is wrong since we seem to be producing people who do the same things.  And those things aren't working.  And if those things can't work.... Why aren't we producing people who have the balls to say that at expense to their career?

Also I don't want to go to staff!

It's been quite a few years, but there used to be a phrase written in huge letters on the wall of the USAFE HQ CAG... "War isn't won with PowerPoint.  War is won by making the enemy do powerpoint!"

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