Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP - The Bonus)

[brabus]

One step further would be not necessarily shitcanning every 365/remote assignment on the planet, but just the 95% that are complete ballwash/bullshit and have either zero real value or, almost as bad, may have some minor value, but they're forcing people to do them who's AFSC has nothing to do with the actual work. If you have to do a remote assignment once in your career, whatever, nobody would really care that much if it was in their primary job, but when you ask people to do one that involves stoplight powerpoints and that's about it...well, doesn't take an MIT grad to figure that one out.

[Ram]

^ This.

We are all about hacking the mission and serving, but when you feel like everyone's time is being wasted at the expense of your spouse and kids, you can't help but sympathize with folks who would do anything to avoid that, including pulling the handle on a possibility of joining the check of the month club.

[BuddhaSixFour]

It sounds like there are a lot of deployed staff positions that are just a waste of everyone's lives and could just be eliminated. But some of them are probably justifiable as necessary *if* a contingency kicked off even if they're a total life suck otherwise.

For those, I propose BSF's trademarked "Deploy from Home" concept. For the first two weeks of your 180-day PowerPoint extravaganza, you deploy, drop your bags off, and learn what your job would be if you ever had to do it. Then, rather than having your life wasted with busy work, you fly home, use the magic of the Internet to stay plugged in, and go about your normal life on a 12-hour mandatory recall. We wouldn't even need to move your bags. Just drop you on any available flight. At the end of your tour, if nothing happens, your stuff gets shipped back to you. Yeah, it would kill your leave plans for 6 months, but the deployment was going to do that anyways.

Would it work for every job? No. Could it work for a lot? Probably. Just a thought.

[disgruntledemployee]

Would it work for every job? No. Could it work for a lot? Probably. Just a thought.

What if you get pregnant?

I have a better idea, delete the useless job altogether. We've all been there and seen or played the wasted job and know what it looks like. Delete! There, now give me my 10% of the savings so i can retire a multi millionaire.

Out

[FlyinGrunt]

But you're missing the genius of what Buddha just laid out: it might actually happen, since it preserves the downrange empires. The O-6s and up get to keep their coveted number of people under their control, and the required work gets done, AND if something ever does kick off, those organizations are already stood up.

Buddha, having done a few deployed staff gigs . . . kudos. I think, were an O-7 or up to propose it, that your idea would help solve the problem. Hell, people might actually volunteer, just for the career cachet.

[Karl Hungus]

Would it work for every job? No. Could it work for a lot? Probably. Just a thought.

It would certainly be a massive improvement. Then again, going to the guard/reserve and not doing a 180/365 day "deployment" at all sounds even better.

[Smokin]

Might save you from the 365, but the guard is already pulling 180 day "deployments".

[Karl Hungus]

Might save you from the 365, but the guard is already pulling 180 day "deployments".

How many of those are involuntary, relative to AD? How many are to Tampa?

My point was that even if the AF "fixes the glitch" when it comes to these worthless deployments, it's still competing with the guard/reserve and the civilian sector for 11x talent. I don't know about you, but there's lots of folks who would much rather sit reserve on the MD-88 in NYC and/or be a guard/reserve bum than do Budda's "deploy from home" concept on AD.

Basically, just like the bonus... it wouldn't be enough to change people's minds.

[tac airlifter]

Basically, just like the bonus... it wouldn't be enough to change people's minds.

I disagree, I think Budda's idea is excellent. There are more people on the fence about the decision to stay or leave AD than you might think, and ideas like this buy down the amount of obvious bullshit and increase chances of keeping talent around. Everything in life is a cost/benefit analysis of some kind- but we each make that calculation differently.

[brabus]

Damn near every dude I know who has taken the bonus in the past several years has ended up on a 365 within 2 years of taking the bonus (some < 1 yr). Many of the bros and I 100% believe bonus = auto 365, and for that reason alone we will not take the bonus. Tac is right - if this "auto 365" went away, I bet there would be more bonus takers/rentention. Everyone wins - except the AF is retarded and will therefore continue to not get it.

[Karl Hungus]

I disagree, I think Budda's idea is excellent. There are more people on the fence about the decision to stay or leave AD than you might think, and ideas like this buy down the amount of obvious bullshit and increase chances of keeping talent around. Everything in life is a cost/benefit analysis of some kind- but we each make that calculation differently.

I said Budda's plan would be a massive improvement. I don't believe the AF would be able to pull it off without f-ing it up, though.

[Pancake]

Maybe it's a good thing for our overall effectiveness that so many pilots are getting out. IMO, sufficient talented guys/gals stay in for a full career, including command, to maintain adequate mentoring and leadership of the punks/FNGs. Pilots transitioning to the reserve component refresh the Guard/Reserve with the diverse experiences of different techniques and tactics found throughout active duty fighter squadrons.

Speaking from my own experience, the last decade and a half of stagnated airline hiring, plus the 10 year commitment, created an huge backlog of pilots who would have preferred a 6-8 year commitment but had nowhere to go except for the next PCS, especially considering many folks were (are) only 6-9 years from an AD retirement by the end of their commitment. Hence, very little attrition of 11Fs from AD and the cultivation of a poisonous "career" culture that's distracted us from focusing on killing the enemy. Not everyone can be the commander, but the Air Force is essentially forced to tell us that we can all make O-6 in order to keep us motivated (promotion, influence, pay, etc...).

The absolute best thing the Air Force could do is drop the 10 year commitment back to 6 or 8 years, with the implied understanding that many pilots will eventually transition to the ANG/AFRES, and promote the fact that AD is a great way to see the world, fly fighters full time for a couple of assignments, then transition to a second career in your early 30s (with the help of the 9/11 GI Bill) and continue to fly fighters in the ANG/AFRES. In the end, the AF essentially maintains its 11F experience level throughout all 3 components, AD becomes less backstabbing as the stakes of the "career game" begin to vanish, and the USAF maintains an equally effective fighter force at a much lower cost.

Flame away...

[TnkrToad]

Maybe it's a good thing for our overall effectiveness that so many pilots are getting out. IMO, sufficient talented guys/gals stay in for a full career, including command, to maintain adequate mentoring and leadership of the punks/FNGs. Pilots transitioning to the reserve component refresh the Guard/Reserve with the diverse experiences of different techniques and tactics found throughout active duty fighter squadrons.

Speaking from my own experience, the last decade and a half of stagnated airline hiring, plus the 10 year commitment, created an huge backlog of pilots who would have preferred a 6-8 year commitment but had nowhere to go except for the next PCS, especially considering many folks were (are) only 6-9 years from an AD retirement by the end of their commitment. Hence, very little attrition of 11Fs from AD and the cultivation of a poisonous "career" culture that's distracted us from focusing on killing the enemy. Not everyone can be the commander, but the Air Force is essentially forced to tell us that we can all make O-6 in order to keep us motivated (promotion, influence, pay, etc...).

The absolute best thing the Air Force could do is drop the 10 year commitment back to 6 or 8 years, with the implied understanding that many pilots will eventually transition to the ANG/AFRES, and promote the fact that AD is a great way to see the world, fly fighters full time for a couple of assignments, then transition to a second career in your early 30s (with the help of the 9/11 GI Bill) and continue to fly fighters in the ANG/AFRES. In the end, the AF essentially maintains its 11F experience level throughout all 3 components, AD becomes less backstabbing as the stakes of the "career game" begin to vanish, and the USAF maintains an equally effective fighter force at a much lower cost.

Flame away...

Not here to beat you down, but to educate. I think the issue is you've seen the skewed effects of fighter pilot overproduction in the late 90s. My SUPT class, for instance, had more T-38s than all the other 3 tracks (T-1s, T-44s, helos) combined . . . and all the T-38 bubbas either got fighters or FAIP with fighter follow ons. Fast forward to the present day, and we've got about twice as many 11Fs as 11Ms in my year group on active duty. Only one 11M from our SUPT class remains on active duty. It didn't take long to fix the late-90s "glitch"--and soon 11F underproduction was the norm. Anyway, I suspect the reason you have such a sanguine view of talent retention is that you've grown up in fighter squadrons where there are plenty of grey beards around.

Talk to a grey beard 11M (O-5 type with 17-20 yrs of service), if you can find one, and ask how the AF has done with talent retention. In my experience, underproduction of 11Ms in the late 90s, combined with Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied Force, OEF-Afghanistan, Noble Eagle alert, Iraqi Freedom, Libya, other real world events and exercises, 180/365 deployments and (ironically) backfilling other short-manned AFSCs (did I mention the airlines are hiring?) has gutted the mobility community of its senior talent. As far as I can tell, the only "fat" in the heavy driver community is in the year groups who have yet to reach the end of their SUPT commitments.

Combining a limited number of O-5 aviators, with a thinned-out bunch of O-4s with a jaded view of rated management (thanks to VSP/RIF/RPA nonvols) and giving young aviators the opportunity to walk out the door and right into airline careers even earlier in their careers strikes me as exactly the opposite of what the Air Force should do.

Who knows, maybe your idea would work with the CAF community. It would be a horribly bad idea for the MAF.

[Sprkt69]

I would have to agree with you that the MAF is different than the CAF in many ways, and I would go as far as to say they should be operated/managed differently as such. Much like how MX under MX needs to end in the CAF. One system for all just does not work well.

[ViperStud]

Pancake, you are ignoring the fact that we require a certain amount of people just to fill all the billets out there. We are seeing a lack of bodies almost everywhere, so where is this backlog you speak of? I'll take Toad's comments to mean there are manning issues at least in the tanker world, if not all of AMC. I saw bros the past few years getting pulled from PIT classes (while already at RND) to go back to the Viper. AFPC has stopped sending fighter guys to RPA and T-6 while cutting back on T-38 bills (and sending heavy dudes to them) all because they can't fill cockpits and 11F staff. And then there are the dudes like me that punched within months of their commitment to join the Guard/Res. Where the hell is this backlog?

I agree with TT that you are smoking crack to think that a shorter commitment is the answer. Allow guys to punch sooner and get less of a return on Big Blue's investment? Good idea. The guys going to non-airline jobs have no incentive to stay and the ones going to airlines can punch as soon as they have the hours or get a call to interview. Not to mention the AF will lose the ability to send a major on a 365 without he/she being able to 3-day opt.

In the short run, the bonus will continue to go up. It already did with the 9-year option; expect annual payments to increase soon. The survey wouldn't have asked if they aren't kicking it around. In the long run, big blue's only option is LONGER commitments for UPT grads.

[guineapigfury]

Another option would be to stop treating people like shit and let them do what they signed up to do (fly airplanes). But only feasible COAs are COAs I guess.

[Pancake]

The 10 year commitment permits Big Blue to treat people like ^^^that^^^.

Two things will keep people on AD: increased control of their career or command. Nobody joined the AF for the 9 year bonus.

Source the ANG/AFRES for staff and deployment shortfalls (1-3 year API-8 AGR tours to staff or AFCENT with $35K/year, for instance). Make UPT/IFF nothing but FAIPs and Reservists with the "requisite" AD chain-of-command. Put the entire RPA mission on the ANG. Let guys/gals get their airline/consultant/lawyer job after 2 assignments and flood the ANG and AFRES TFI units with mid-level O-3s off AD who have 20+ years of part-time service left (all the while maintaining RAP). Let the AD careerists focus more on flying and deployed staff and less on AADs/exec jobs/non-denominational winter solstice parties. Reward that smaller pool with command. Every USAF AD flying squadron should have an associate reserve squadron. Let them be the gray hairs.

Reducing the commitment to 6 years essentially creates the defacto warrant officer program we've all thought of as the solution to the overall retention problem, as long as the reserve component is expanded to absorb the RAP commitment of maintaining an effective CAF/MAF/ATC.

Edited July 9, 2015 by Pancake

[Majestik Møøse]

Pancake for President

[Jaded]

Why change the bonus when you can just stop loss people? All of you that think the air force is going to be forward thinking about this are crazy.

[sqwatch]

convince the endless supply of 18-22 year olds who will do anything to fly airforce aircraft that a ten year commitment is too much is when you will see change from management.

[TnkrToad]

The 10 year commitment permits Big Blue to treat people like ^^^that^^^.

Two things will keep people on AD: increased control of their career or command. Nobody joined the AF for the 9 year bonus.

Source the ANG/AFRES for staff and deployment shortfalls (1-3 year API-8 AGR tours to staff or AFCENT with $35K/year, for instance). Make UPT/IFF nothing but FAIPs and Reservists with the "requisite" AD chain-of-command. Put the entire RPA mission on the ANG. Let guys/gals get their airline/consultant/lawyer job after 2 assignments and flood the ANG and AFRES TFI units with mid-level O-3s off AD who have 20+ years of part-time service left (all the while maintaining RAP). Let the AD careerists focus more on flying and deployed staff and less on AADs/exec jobs/non-denominational winter solstice parties. Reward that smaller pool with command. Every USAF AD flying squadron should have an associate reserve squadron. Let them be the gray hairs.

Reducing the commitment to 6 years essentially creates the defacto warrant officer program we've all thought of as the solution to the overall retention problem, as long as the reserve component is expanded to absorb the RAP commitment of maintaining an effective CAF/MAF/ATC.

- Actually, I'm talking about folks with 8 year commitments who were treated like this. Don't confuse length of commitment with COCOMs' insatiable appetite for airpower

- Command should never be a perk of staying on AD. Selecting commanders by default--whoever bothers to stay in gets to lead a group of steely-eyed killers--strikes me as a recipe for disaster

- We don't all agree that a de facto warrant officer program is a good idea. While it's awesome that the ARC provides a relative wealth of talent & experience, to be called on when necessary, keeping the ARC focused on tactical-level excellence and the AD even more focused on getting folks through SUPT/RTU/SOS/WIC is no way to build a competent, professional force capable of executing air/space/cyber power at the operational and strategic levels

If we are going to have the Air Force that our nation needs, we need to adequately retain and highly train enough long-serving professional AD USAF officers--from an appropriate cross section of AFSCs--to execute the mission. I don't see your plan meeting this intent.

Alternate COA:

- Targeted promo rates, based on AFSC: helps ensure folks with proper backgrounds are represented in leadership and important staff positions. Also provides added incentive for quality individuals to crossflow to RPAs/wherever the AF is hurting

- Targeted bonuses, based on AFSC and year group: for those who have needed expertise but do not desire command, it offers a way to keep them on AD & hence contributing to the mission

-- Part of the frustration you might have sensed in my earlier post stems from HAF/A1 cluelessness. A particular community might be adequately manned overall, but that does not mean certain year groups within that community aren't being/haven't been crushed. Straying away from my 11M diatribe, when/if the RPA community ever reaches 100% manning, ask one of the O-5 types at that time how healthy they think their community is. The few grey beards they have will have been overworked for the majority of their careers, and the FNGs will be stacked like cord wood in the squadron and fighting for additional duties. Doesn't sound like a healthy organization to me.

- Rather than cutting the AD service commitment for SUPT (which would further drive up AD training costs--constantly training FNGs then sending them to the airlines and/or ARC), take measures to minimize admin queep: 1) eliminate valueless training/reporting/surveys/etc., and 2) hire additional admin personnel to cover any necessary yet burdensome admin requirements that are left

I could go into a whole history lesson about how a microcosm of the plan you're suggesting was tried with the Army Air Corps in the 1930s (train lots of folks, keep them on AD for short period of time, send them to the Reserves, keep a totally inadequate number of long-serving professionals on active duty), and how that led to disastrous wartime results, but it's not Friday and I've already spent too much time on this post.

Airpower über alles,

TT

[Pancake]

- Actually, I'm talking about folks with 8 year commitments who were treated like this. Don't confuse length of commitment with COCOMs' insatiable appetite for airpower

Create a larger reserve force from the ranks of AD folks begging to have more control of their lives/career than AD can offer.

- Command should never be a perk of staying on AD. Selecting commanders by default--whoever bothers to stay in gets to lead a group of steely-eyed killers--strikes me as a recipe for disaster

Uh, isn't that what we do right now, choose our leaders from those who have stayed on active duty? I don't see us activating the best ANG officers to become AD squadron commanders, or recalling folks from civilian careers to take over an AD mobility wing, etc...

- We don't all agree that a de facto warrant officer program is a good idea. While it's awesome that the ARC provides a relative wealth of talent & experience, to be called on when necessary, keeping the ARC focused on tactical-level excellence and the AD even more focused on getting folks through SUPT/RTU/SOS/WIC is no way to build a competent, professional force capable of executing air/space/cyber power at the operational and strategic levels

Ha! AD talking points?

If we are going to have the Air Force that our nation needs, we need to adequately retain and highly train enough long-serving professional AD USAF officers--from an appropriate cross section of AFSCs--to execute the mission. I don't see your plan meeting this intent.

I disagree. I submit it's those same "highly trained, long-serving professional AD officers" that got us into this mess. I think some time in the reserve component gives leaders better perspective on leadership and efficient/effective ways to accomplish the mission. You do realize that generally, the longest serving officers are in the reserve component. I know (and have gone to war with) several very sharp, very capable reserve corps leaders. They have been the best leaders I've seen in my combined AD/ANG career... several are O-6s and a couple are O-7s. All have been in strategic roles after many years of successful tactical experience. And most of them are part-timers (airline guys) that are flow in and out of AGR assignments.

Alternate COA:

- Targeted promo rates, based on AFSC: helps ensure folks with proper backgrounds are represented in leadership and important staff positions. Also provides added incentive for quality individuals to crossflow to RPAs/wherever the AF is hurting

- Targeted bonuses, based on AFSC and year group: for those who have needed expertise but do not desire command, it offers a way to keep them on AD & hence contributing to the mission

-- Part of the frustration you might have sensed in my earlier post stems from HAF/A1 cluelessness. A particular community might be adequately manned overall, but that does not mean certain year groups within that community aren't being/haven't been crushed. Straying away from my 11M diatribe, when/if the RPA community ever reaches 100% manning, ask one of the O-5 types at that time how healthy they think their community is. The few grey beards they have will have been overworked for the majority of their careers, and the FNGs will be stacked like cord wood in the squadron and fighting for additional duties. Doesn't sound like a healthy organization to me.

- Rather than cutting the AD service commitment for SUPT (which would further drive up AD training costs--constantly training FNGs then sending them to the airlines and/or ARC), take measures to minimize admin queep: 1) eliminate valueless training/reporting/surveys/etc., and 2) hire additional admin personnel to cover any necessary yet burdensome admin requirements that are left

I could go into a whole history lesson about how a microcosm of the plan you're suggesting was tried with the Army Air Corps in the 1930s (train lots of folks, keep them on AD for short period of time, send them to the Reserves, keep a totally inadequate number of long-serving professionals on active duty), and how that led to disastrous wartime results, but it's not Friday and I've already spent too much time on this post.

You mean like Iraq and all the generals we ant through until we got to Patreus? Or the Mosley debacle? We have had both good and disastrous leaders through think and thin AD manning numbers. Correlation is not causation.

ANG/AFRES officers are some of the finest professional military officers I have served with. Tactically proficient, strategically coherent, and masters of balancing resources (their time), and in many cases willing to sacrifice more lucrative civilian careers to serve their country. Today's reserve component is not the rag-tag bunch inferred in the above paragraph. They maintain RAP, do PME, have AADs (that they actually use), take Pentagon assignments, go to staff, etc... With all those boxes checked, what makes them less capable than their AD counterparts?

Airpower über alles,

TT

My alternate COA: instead of a 5 or 9 year bonus package, offer year-to-year (two year for PCS) bonuses of 35K to short-manned rated career fields, with the understanding that in-res IDE (the true metric of the likelihood of future command) and promotion beyond O-5 are very unlikely. Cap these folks at 20 years of service, with commander discretion to 22 or something. I know the AF wants to "manage" its people in 3-4 year blocks (how's that worked so far?), but give people career control/exit ramps and you'll have a more satisfied rated cadre with higher year-to-year retainment, force AFPC to actually find solutions while providing enough "body putty" to plug shortfalls, and get away from "it's a privilege to serve, now do what I tell you or else" leadership mentality we currently have (I heard a couple of years ago we lost nearly a dozen WIC instructors to one 365 that eventually went unfilled after everyone 3-day opted).

Having been on both sides of the AD/RES fence, it's amazing how little AD leadership seems to understand the ANG/AFRES and their potential. I guess they see it as a threat to the AD empire, which is a shame. Not just for the AF, but for all DoD, as many of the best and brightest (not all, certainly not me) go the reserve component route in order to have more control of their lives/better take care of their families/do something THEY want to do, not something Big Blue/Green wants them to do.

The key to retention (in some form or fashion, not all or nothing as you propose) is making people WANT to be part of the organization, not forcing them with awful ADSCs and other various threats. I don't see how shortening the UPT ADSC or offering year-to-year bonuses costs the AF any more money, as people didn't go through commissioning/UPT/FTU/MQT/employing weapons on bad people/air dropping food and water to Yazidis on Sinjar to cut ties at the first opportunity, and we're essentially already paying people 25K (maybe 35K soon) to stay in anyway (would the AF rather have a handful of guys stay in for 5 or 9 years, or a bunch stay in and get to make that decision every two or three years?). People joined to serve and will continue to voluntarily do so until it negatively effects their families. IMO, most people get out because it's the best thing to do for their families, not because they don't want to serve anymore... Shorter commitments make people more likely to stay in for a period of time, as the flexibility is generally better for family life. That explains why people go ANG/AFRES, they WANT to keep serving (not always best for family, especially deployments), but want to do what's best for their family/children/etc (stability, income potential, the ability to say NO without adversely affecting the entirety of the rest of their career).

Anyway, sorry for the brain vomit... just typing as fast as I can think with little or no organization.

Cheers!

Edited July 9, 2015 by Pancake

[ViperStud]

The 10 year commitment permits Big Blue to treat people like ^^^that^^^.

Two things will keep people on AD: increased control of their career or command. Nobody joined the AF for the 9 year bonus.

Source the ANG/AFRES for staff and deployment shortfalls (1-3 year API-8 AGR tours to staff or AFCENT with $35K/year, for instance). Make UPT/IFF nothing but FAIPs and Reservists with the "requisite" AD chain-of-command. Put the entire RPA mission on the ANG. Let guys/gals get their airline/consultant/lawyer job after 2 assignments and flood the ANG and AFRES TFI units with mid-level O-3s off AD who have 20+ years of part-time service left (all the while maintaining RAP). Let the AD careerists focus more on flying and deployed staff and less on AADs/exec jobs/non-denominational winter solstice parties. Reward that smaller pool with command. Every USAF AD flying squadron should have an associate reserve squadron. Let them be the gray hairs.

Reducing the commitment to 6 years essentially creates the defacto warrant officer program we've all thought of as the solution to the overall retention problem, as long as the reserve component is expanded to absorb the RAP commitment of maintaining an effective CAF/MAF/ATC.

Dreams vs Reality. Individuals having more career control means AFPC loses some control: won't happen.

Sourcing ANG/AFRES for deployment and/or staff is a non-starter. Dudes like me punched to the ANG/AFRES for the QOL. Many of us have civilian (airline, contractor, etc) jobs that are incompatible with 1-3 years off. Expect ANG/AFRES dudes to line up for those exec jobs? You really don't get why a lot of dudes went to the ANG/AFRES.

UPT/IFF all FAIPS and Reserve? Holy shit. I spent slightly over 2 years teaching at a UPT base. Never at any assignment have I seen such a disparity between the bottom and top tier instructors. The MWS IPs mentored punks about the CAF/MAF, got them ready for IFF and generally had their shit together. FAIPs need the mentoring of MWS IPs. Some of the part-timers need it more; plus they produce the least relative to the sorties they require for their semi-annual beans.

Entire RPA mission on the guard? It works in Tucson because the location is a pretty good deal. Good luck hiring ANG dudes to Creech and Cannon. Won't happen. The AFRES is already learning this lesson in Holloman.

Mid-level Capts don't have 20+ years in the ANG. They are either going to 20 only and taking the part time pension or getting full-time Tech or AGR gigs. No one troughs their way to an AD-equivalent pension by punching at 6-9 years and spending only 20 in the ANG/AFRES unless they get put on long-term orders or get an AGR job.

"as long as the reserve component is expanded to absorb the RAP commitment of maintaining an effective CAF/MAF/ATC" - here lies the biggest problem of all: money and flying hours. The going logic is that it takes 3 part-timers to make the output of one full-timer. Sure, let dudes punch after 6 years, then keep 3x as many of them around part-time in the ANG/AFRES as you would need if you kept exclusively full-time dudes (with a longer commitment). In an era of decreasing budgets and flying hours, how do they all make RAP?

Oh, and AFPC needs to start worrying about actually taking care of people instead of just being able to assign people to billets. Good luck with that. It would be great if they cared enough, but they don't.

[billy pilgrim]

Oh, and AFPC needs to start worrying about actually taking care of people instead of just being able to assign people to billets. Good luck with that. It would be great if they cared enough, but they don't.

A buddy of mine were BSing in the scheduling shop yesterday about all of this. He has palace chased to the guard at the end of his ADSC after getting TAMMY-21'd and then back to fighters. It's not that guys don't want to be in AD, or that they don't want to serve.

His quote was something along the lines of:

"It's mind boggling how you can take the coolest job in the world and people want to leave!?!"

I don't want to leave AD, but I probably will. I know for sure I won't touch the bonus with a 10' pole. Money motivates some people, but I think those that find themselves in the CAF (I'm sure it's the same in other areas - just speaking for personal experience) have a lot of options that don't really make money a primary motivator. According to Malcolm Gladwell (Blink, Outliers, David and Goliath etc...) the things that make work rewarding are: complexity, autonomy and effort tied to reward. I think for the 11X field the last one suffers. Likewise the three things (according to him) that make effective leadership are fairness, predictability and subordinates feeling like they have a voice. I think the AF fails wholesale at all three of those.

It takes a tremendous amount of time and effort for someone to become a proficient active duty 11X. From personal experience and I have less than zero faith that I or the guys I work with won't get royally f'd just to make some power point slide square turn green for some O-6+. It's like if you spent 10 years trying to become a medical doctor and every year or so you may have to go work some menial job (maybe for the rest of your career) that you hate and have little training or desire to do just based on "needs of the hospital".

There is certainly a disconnect between the senior leadership and the "drawdown force" that I have been a part of for the past decade. I have been impressed with the majority of guys I've gotten to fly with across all MWS's. The world's most proficient and lethal fighting force has slowly been starving to death and all of you guys have been making it happen despite of it.

Good luck. My take on the bonus is that $1k/month is not worth giving up complete control of your life.

[Danny Noonin]

Good post Beer Man. Agree 100%