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Atlas 767 (Amazon livery) Down


ThreeHoler

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It sounds like a KC-135E that crashed on approach to Geilenkirchen, stab trim run away , left the rest of the remaining fleet looking for serviceable jackscrew units. 737 jurassics had a problem with its rudder going full deflection on approach causing a snap roll, later found that the power control unit fluid got so hot it caused it to lock up. 

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  • 5 weeks later...

From another forum:

“I received this today. Obviously I don’t know how accurate especially with no final NTSB report. I share only as something to think about especially with an emphasis on upset recovery. There may be flaws in the possible scenario below but again maybe it can happen to one of us out there so I’m sharing.

Sent to me from someone else....

Subject: Houston Amazon 767 Crash

Just FYI… we’ve heard the full cockpit audio and seen the data.  Here’s what really happened (name redacted please to protect the innocent!):

During the approach, at about 6,000 FT (being flown by the first officer), the Captain reached around the throttle quadrant to extend the flaps to the next position after being called to do so by the first officer (pilot flying)… very normal.  

In many aircraft including the 767, that’s a very odd/difficult repositioning of your hand (from the left seat, all the way around to the right side of the center console), and requires intimate familiarity and slow deliberate motion to do successfully.

Well in any case, it was not done so this time.  The captain accidently hit the “go around” switch while bringing his hand around for the flaps, which brought both engines up to full power.  In the landing configuration, as this aircraft was transitioning into, that obviously causes a vast increase in lift… and the first officer (pilot flying) used everything he had to force the nose back down.  

Still not sure why that occurred, as the crew should have just “gone around” and tried it again when properly configured… but they did not.  And that started in motion a chain of events that lead to tragedy.

As the First Officer over-rotated downward, again with the engines at full power, the aircraft quickly accelerated and approached something we’re all trained to handle (at least in good training environments)… an “upset recovery”, countered by NON-AUTOMATION and basic “stick and rudder skills”.  

This captain however, in turn, grabbed the controls without using positive command (“I’ve got”, “My aircraft”, or anything normally done), and countered the F/O’s control input by completely hauling his control column full aft… remember, while the F/O is pushing full forward.

In the process of doing that, he broke the “shear pin” on his control column (a device/mechanical safety interlock used to separate a control column from the “innards” of the control architecture in the event one control column is doing something it should not)… and that occurred here.

The captain, a few seconds later, now accelerating downward out of the control envelope of the 767 (remember, all of this started at 6000 FT and probably took less time to get to the fatal point than it did to read this far), recognizes the has no control column and then asks the F/O to pull up, get the nose up, or something to that affect.  It isn’t 100% clear what he says.

The F/O then tries to pull aft on his column (going from full forward to full aft), but isn’t getting the response he needs, because the aircraft is out of the envelope of controllability and the controls are “air-loaded” in position.

At about 2000 FT, eventually the trim motors are able to start overcoming the air-load, and the aircraft begins to attempt to arrest its rate of descent… but alas it’s far too little, far too late, and the aircraft impacts about 30-40 degrees nose down, with what is believed to be about 4-5000 FT / minute rate of descent.

All during this time the throttles aren’t touched until somewhere during that last few seconds of flight… which is believed to be what enabled the trim motors to start working.  Unclear who does it, and no audio indicates who it was.

Just FYI… we’ve attempted in our 767 simulators to recover from the event with the exact same setup, and thus far we’ve only had success when starting at 8000’ or higher… meaning we are fully established in the “out of control” position at 8000’, recognize it by then, and initiate recovery starting at 8000’.  

These guys started the whole thing at 6000’ and were much lower when a true recovery attempt was initiated.  No chance, and just shows you how quickly you can get “out of the envelope” when you don’t follow procedure, try some completely erroneous recovery technique, and don’t have a clue what you’re doing.

So many things went wrong with crew coordination, basic flying skills, aircraft envelope awareness, basic procedures, and such… that this will likely go down as one of the absolute worst “pilot error” events ever.  

It needs to have serious impact throughout the Amazon flying circus (and associated partnerships), and show people that Jeff Bezos’ attempt to push the envelope at lower cost, all things else be damned, doesn’t apply to aviation.  

This accident no doubt was absolutely horrible, and three people lost their lives…one of them (the jumpseater) through absolutely no fault of his own. But making an approach into Houston, TX, it could have been so much worse.  In another few miles, they would have been over major population centers and who knows what would have happened then.

Know your aircraft.  Know your procedures.  And for God sakes, just FLY!  It’s not a video game!”

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1 hour ago, herkbier said:

Just a Herk driver with no clue in the world.. landing configuration at 6000 feet? No way, that seems crazy. Is that standard ops for a 767?

Where did it say anything about landing config? I didn’t see it but I may have missed it. A low setting of flaps at 6k’ is very normal. 

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Depending on gross weight, you might need to go FLAPS 1 (just extends the leading edge devices) to slow to @210-220 KIAS.  Extending flaps out of up puts the airplane into approach mode and makes the TOGA switch active.  I've flown several Boeings and it is not uncommon to select flaps 1 10-11K feet depending on the arrival.

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1 hour ago, Day Man said:

are they not called slats?

They are called that in the systems manual although on a typical flight, you rarely hear slats specifically referred to since Boeing doesn't really "do" slats.  No one I've heard talks about LEDs, but that could be specific company "speak".  757, 767 and 777 control all the high lift devices with the flap handle and commands to extend them are always called using "flaps ____".  Flaps 1 extends only slats to mid-range where they stay as trailing edge flaps are selected to 5, 15, 20.  Slats fully extend to the landing position once flaps 25 or 30 are selected (either 25 or 30 can be used for landing).

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17 minutes ago, JeremiahWeed said:

They are called that in the systems manual although on a typical flight, you rarely hear slats specifically referred to since Boeing doesn't really "do" slats.  No one I've heard talks about LEDs, but that could be specific company "speak".  757, 767 and 777 control all the high lift devices with the flap handle and commands to extend them are always called using "flaps ____".  Flaps 1 extends only slats to mid-range where they stay as trailing edge flaps are selected to 5, 15, 20.  Slats fully extend to the landing position once flaps 25 or 30 are selected (either 25 or 30 can be used for landing).

Interesting, as they are 'slats' on the -17...thanks for the reply. 🍻

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2 hours ago, Day Man said:

are they not called slats?

Yes, they are. I've made far too many trips through the schoolhouse (72/73/75/76/77/78 and the POS 80) and somewhere in the process, the phrase "Leading edge devices" has been embedded in my brain. That's my answer and I'm sticking to it. 

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5 hours ago, Hacker said:

IMHO, that summary -- if correct -- is grossly under-playing the FO's control inputs that placed the airplane (reportedly) 49 degrees nose low.

That's not just a minor erroneous response to an upset.

Agreed. It was a HUGE erroneous response to an upset.

At the risk of speaking ill of the deceased: Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by ...

There still could be more to the story, but there are a few reports of the FOs skill and personality out there. When factored in with the above account, the math adds up.

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Having flown the 737/757/767 and now the 330, this is why like the thrust lever situation in the Bus.  If you want to Go-Around you simply push the thrust levers all the way forward.  No buttons to inadvertently hit, which is somewhat easy on the 757.  If you accidentally "bump" the thrust levers on the bus, you'll simply get a ding and a message that essentially says "hey dummy, put your thrust levers back where they were." 

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8 hours ago, E-3FMM said:

Some Boeing aircraft have both leading edge flaps and slats, so they are referred to as leading edge devices.

All Boeing transport category aircraft have leading edge slats and some also have krueger flaps.  At the companies at which I’ve flown them, they are not referred to as leading edge devices, nor is that  term used in the Boeing generated systems manual or quick reference handbook   No one is going to be confused if you refer to them as LEDs, but in my experience, you don’t hear Boeing operators use that term in the regular course of flying those aircraft, running checklists, etc.  

The MD-11 and DC-10 (MD-10) are the same as the C-17. There’s an initial “slats” position of the handle that controls the high lift devices and they’re referring to as slats during ops.  No one I know makes a habit of calling them LEDs on those aircraft either. 

Semantics 101 complete 🤪

Edited by JeremiahWeed
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2 hours ago, SocialD said:

Having flown the 737/757/767 and now the 330, this is why like the thrust lever situation in the Bus.  If you want to Go-Around you simply push the thrust levers all the way forward.  No buttons to inadvertently hit, which is somewhat easy on the 757.  If you accidentally "bump" the thrust levers on the bus, you'll simply get a ding and a message that essentially says "hey dummy, put your thrust levers back where they were." 

As a simple helicopter guy why can you just “undo” the TOGA? Seems like if you press a button to initiate full thrust then you should be able to deselect it.

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As a simple helicopter guy why can you just “undo” the TOGA? Seems like if you press a button to initiate full thrust then you should be able to deselect it.
You absolutely can, by simply turning off the autothrottles (buttons on the throttles).

Sent from my SM-N960U using Tapatalk

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14 hours ago, Day Man said:

are they not called slats?

Yes, they are.  I must have picked that up at the schoolhouse training for the 72/73/75/76/77/78 or the POS MD-80.  That phrase "leading edge devices" must be embedded in there somewhere.  That's my story and I'm sticking to it.

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Is it really realistic that they accidentally wound up almost 50 degrees nose low responding to a power increase? I’ve never flown a big old airliner, I just feel it would take a good amount of time to get that nose low without a malfunction, and would be incredibly uncomfortable if you happen to look out the window. But I’m just a guy that knows nothing about computers being involved in controlling a plane. 

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Getting just 10 degrees nose low in a big old airliner feels excessive. I'm not sure what the pitch change rate might be but getting 50 degrees nose low doesn't  happen that quick and how you get there without somebody noticing and correcting the situation escapes me. I've seen guys in the sim get behind in roll control with engine failures but I've never seen anything close to losing control in pitch with any type of failure.

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