AF Considering Short Term OA-X

[Clark Griswold]

OA-X would not be allowed to employ without the general or higher on the other end of the ISR tether approving it.

Unfortunately that is likely but one can and must argue for us to remember our roots

Centralized planning Decentralized execution

The tether that modern links provide has become a chain dragging down our aggressiveness and offensive capability as an AF



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[Lawman]

Unfortunately that is likely but one can and must argue for us to remember our roots

Centralized planning Decentralized execution

The tether that modern links provide has become a chain dragging down our aggressiveness and offensive capability as an AF

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Aggressiveness is exactly what the GFC and 3 letter agencies driving these COIN wars don't want. It's more important to them to not kill the wrong people or do something with 2nd/3rd order effects than it is to find, identify, and prosecute targets.

Tactical patience is the buzz word of the day. Not only that but overreaching the level of approval for "immediate" CAS is just a standard. Do you really think that Infantry Captain on the ground is empowered to make the decision? Short of some they're in the wire!" Battle of Wanat type scenario he/she has to call mom for permission. The second you accept that and can push feed the quicker that process becomes, especially in a War that lacks the constant TOC porn of PGSS balloons those senior commanders grew up depending on to make decisions. Real war, real CAS, real phase lines, real threat... That will not be an issue. But for COIN fight, you're an ISR platform whether you like it or not.

Along with that, since we only seem to have more issue getting actual ISR because there are only so many to go around, you increase the legitimacy for the need if this low cost strike aircraft can do that job for the 97% of the time where it's just boring holes in the sky waiting for the 911 call.

[magnetfreezer]

28 minutes ago, Lawman said:

 

Aggressiveness is exactly what the GFC and 3 letter agencies driving these COIN wars don't want. It's more important to them to not kill the wrong people or do something with 2nd/3rd order effects than it is to find, identify, and prosecute targets.

Tactical patients is the buzz word of the day. Not only that but overreaching the level of approval for "immediate" CAS is just a standard. Do you really think that Infantry Captain on the ground is empowered to make the decision? Short of some they're in the wire!" Battle of Wanat type scenario he/she has to call mom for permission. The second you accept that and can push feed the quicker that process becomes, especially in a War that lacks the constant TOC porn of PGSS balloons those senior commanders grew up depending on to make decisions. Real war, real CAS, real phase lines, real threat... That will not be an issue. But for COIN fight, you're an ISR platform whether you like it or not.

Along with that, since we only seem to have more issue getting actual ISR because there are only so many to go around, you increase the legitimacy for the need if this low cost strike aircraft can do that job for the 97% of the time where it's just boring holes in the sky waiting for the 911 call.

 

We gave the GFC and 3 letter agencies 15 years to try things their way, the only thing taking authority away from the Capt on the ground does is put him and his troops in danger. Japan was an insurgency in the making (ref. the guys who came out of the jungle in various SE asia countries 10 years later ready to die for the emperor); it could only be defeated with overwhelming force. Plus a lot of the "need" for ISR is someone just wanting video overhead without an op going on or even EEIs to look for. That's part of what's driven the explosion in RPA CAPs, etc. and created something similar to the CSI effect for leadership (just like juries want to see DNA/etc all the time, leadership will not approve anything without incontrovertible FMV).

[Lawman]

We gave the GFC and 3 letter agencies 15 years to try things their way, the only thing taking authority away from the Capt on the ground does is put him and his troops in danger. Japan was an insurgency in the making (ref. the guys who came out of the jungle in various SE asia countries 10 years later ready to die for the emperor); it could only be defeated with overwhelming force. Plus a lot of the "need" for ISR is someone just wanting video overhead without an op going on or even EEIs to look for. That's part of what's driven the explosion in RPA CAPs, etc. and created something similar to the CSI effect for leadership (just like juries want to see DNA/etc all the time, leadership will not approve anything without incontrovertible FMV).

What about any of the fights we are in that you guys are calling the justification for low cost light strike resembles "overwhelming force?" Africa? The Philippines? Iraq/Afghanistan?

If you need overwhelming force, or more specifically if our bosses even let us engage in a fight with overwhelming force the firepower on the ground and in the air will look like it did when we crossed the berm in 03. For that type of war the flight hour costs argument won't really matter because we get all our starters for that one.

Anywhere else you aren't allowed overwhelming force. When you've got ground commanders pushing for lower and lower CDE and more importantly congress letting us do the same brush fire war with 1/8th the troops and 1/5th the money having a 21st century A-10 that does nothing but "CAS" all day every day isn't the solution. I put CAS in parenthesis because what you and I are doing isn't what that term was made for. There aren't lines of effort or a main effort to delegate that element too in coordinated planning. You aren't massing fires with combined armed maneuver to achieve an objective. We aren't worried about a company of BMPs counter attacking our infantry while they consolidate the objective. The requirement of making X-CAS on the ATO overlap like a bus schedule and having stuff in the air for whatever TIC comes up is nothing more than aerial QRF.

But if you want the attention and more importantly the money that goes with it in this fight you had better get on board with the ability to be an ISR platform and cycle that feed into the decision process. There is a reason the Army keeps wanting to deploy Heavy Attack Recon squadrons over standard Attack battalions to Iraq. None of the ABs have gotten their grey eagle up and running yet and the ARS shows up with 12 Shadows (which they have) to give the GFC. Guess which one the powers that be keep asking for. The genie is out of the bottle on active feed TOC porn. The only way we are ever going to get off that crutch is going to be when we fight a real war against a real enemy who can either hard or soft kill our ability to conduct that link. Until then stamping your feet on the ground and screaming "get out of my cockpit!" Is just going to result in you being benched in favor of the platforms that can push. We fought that battle in the Apache... And we lost.

[magnetfreezer]

38 minutes ago, Lawman said:

The genie is out of the bottle on active feed TOC porn. The only way we are ever going to get off that crutch is going to be when we fight a real war against a real enemy who can either hard or soft kill our ability to conduct that link. Until then stamping your feet on the ground and screaming "get out of my cockpit!" Is just going to result in you being benched in favor of the platforms that can push. We fought that battle in the Apache... And we lost.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgCr8Ljb90g

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Ecq7kRmCho

Plenty of things to do in a COIN fight with overwhelming force... Africa and Philippines, SOF support, agreed there is a place for ISR/fire support in a SOF only situation. If commanders are not executing IAW doctrine, at least an optimist can hope that they can debrief and change their ways appropriately without the shock of a near-peer taking out links/ISR. Thought there was a chance initially with OIR; unfortunately the Army was incorrectly left as JFC (JFC should have been the CFACC based on who was providing the preponderance of forces in OIR at the time) which resulted in a lot of the same practices being applied and a lost opportunity.

[Lawman]

Plenty of things to do in a COIN fight with overwhelming force... Africa and Philippines, SOF support, agreed there is a place for ISR/fire support in a SOF only situation. If commanders are not executing IAW doctrine, at least an optimist can hope that they can debrief and change their ways appropriately without the shock of a near-peer taking out links/ISR. Thought there was a chance initially with OIR; unfortunately the Army was incorrectly left as JFC (JFC should have been the CFACC based on who was providing the preponderance of forces in OIR at the time) which resulted in a lot of the same practices being applied and a lost opportunity.

The chemical strike Mosul shaping operation could have just as well been done with bombers out of CONUS or strike aircraft based well outside of theatre. Or for that matter non aircraft delivered fires (MLRS/Tomahawk/etc). It didn't require an A specific "all we do is CAS/interdiction" type airplane effects and capes, so it doesn't really move the needle for getting an A-10 specific replacement.

Most importantly to the discussion of pushing live feeds... nothing about that strike involved a true dynamic targeting situation where a small element GFC had to make time sensitive decisions to give clearance that could have strategic after effects. There was no threat pressure or a ground element in danger. You don't have troops in maneuver to worry about danger close ranges or flying an ingress to avoid the 60mm mortars GTL. And the entire targeting process was built around getting pattern of life and acceptable CDE for the 3 letter driven strategic mission (whatever the hell that is this week) from you guessed it... ISR.

Believe me I'd love to get people the hell out of my cockpit and go back to a system of trust in your crews training to do the right thing. But having participated in the targeting/decision process in a non centcom brush fire war... the decision process is so strategic risk driven over combat needs it's not going away. The danger you guys really risk if you don't get onboard with some of this tech is having what happened to a lot of Apache units in the gap between VUIT2 and MUMT. You get benched for the platform that has a rover code.


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[Clark Griswold]

5 hours ago, Lawman said:

Aggressiveness is exactly what the GFC and 3 letter agencies driving these COIN wars don't want. It's more important to them to not kill the wrong people or do something with 2nd/3rd order effects than it is to find, identify, and prosecute targets.

Tactical patients is the buzz word of the day. Not only that but overreaching the level of approval for "immediate" CAS is just a standard. Do you really think that Infantry Captain on the ground is empowered to make the decision? Short of some they're in the wire!" Battle of Wanat type scenario he/she has to call mom for permission. The second you accept that and can push feed the quicker that process becomes, especially in a War that lacks the constant TOC porn of PGSS balloons those senior commanders grew up depending on to make decisions. Real war, real CAS, real phase lines, real threat... That will not be an issue. But for COIN fight, you're an ISR platform whether you like it or not.

Along with that, since we only seem to have more issue getting actual ISR because there are only so many to go around, you increase the legitimacy for the need if this low cost strike aircraft can do that job for the 97% of the time where it's just boring holes in the sky waiting for the 911 call.

 

Maybe but for my opinion that approach (restrictive ROE, maybe overly preoccupied with preventing 2/3rd order effects) is not getting us any closer to victory, an acceptable end state, a point where we can call it good, whatever... the problem is that it destroys a drip at a time the enemy's forces not the enemy himself, leaving him to regenerate his attrited forces to fight another day.  This approach however is also keeping the shit to shoe level so it is not without some merit, it just doesn't finish the task.

Tactical patience seems like dithering.  We have to pick a side, arm the F out of them, look the other way when they do unseemly things and just blast through.  

5 hours ago, magnetfreezer said:

We gave the GFC and 3 letter agencies 15 years to try things their way, the only thing taking authority away from the Capt on the ground does is put him and his troops in danger. Japan was an insurgency in the making (ref. the guys who came out of the jungle in various SE asia countries 10 years later ready to die for the emperor); it could only be defeated with overwhelming force. Plus a lot of the "need" for ISR is someone just wanting video overhead without an op going on or even EEIs to look for. That's part of what's driven the explosion in RPA CAPs, etc. and created something similar to the CSI effect for leadership (just like juries want to see DNA/etc all the time, leadership will not approve anything without incontrovertible FMV).

2

We're at 60 CAPs and the plan is to go to 90, great.  You perform a mission with tactics as part of a strategy to win a war, prosecute a conflict, affect your enemy's behavior, or shape the battlespace; not to do them because that is what we do because that is what we do.  

The FMV feed has given the illusion of positive action towards victory / an acceptable outcome along with a false sense of control / insight to whatever element is receiving it.

We could grow to 1000 CAPs and it would not matter, without the strategy to win or at least get to an acceptable end state, it is holes in the sky followed by whack a mole sometimes.  After some X hundreds of good hits, is this really getting us closer to victory?  Maybe, but is it fast enough given that militaries are funded by politicians that get swapped out, loose interest, become impatient, don't understand the military situation and might prematurely pull the plug?  You bet.

 Democracies don't fight long frustrating wars / conflicts well usually.  They get tired, bored, frustrated and sustaining the political will becomes problematic.  We have to be on the march, moving the ball down the field in an easily perceptible manner.  Or we have to be mature enough as a country to accept that we are in for probably 20 years of suppressing an insurgency while simultaneously rebuilding a nation that is likely populated by people who DGAF about what we are doing there at best and likely don't actually want us there, not holding breath...

Edited October 3, 2016 by Clark Griswold
minor fixes

[Lawman]

On Clarks theme....


That needs to be the white paper somebody publishes.

Give me a year long study evaluating the total cost of two scenarios.

Scenario 1: the minimum participation, arm the "good guys," train and advise model of COIN. We are gonna be there, we are gonna stay there, let's not pretend it's gonna be a thankful job.

Scenario 2: the kick his teeth and skull in shock and awe massive killing spree where we leave the bodies and burned out hilux's in the street throwing some money for rebuild on our way out like some businessman leaving an escorts hotel room. This model means no G.A.F. except to know we will have to come back in 10 years later.


If they both result in the same thing, i.e. They keep their little holy war in the holy land, I'd like to see a real cost comparison between them.

Cheaper model gets to be the "winning model," because God know we never seem to get to leave any of these places in reality.

[Blue]

6 hours ago, Lawman said:

Tactical patients is the buzz word of the day. 

 

Tactical patients?

[Lawman]

Tactical patients?

Auto correct.

You know what I meant.

[Clark Griswold]

On October 2, 2016 at 10:46 PM, Lawman said:

Auto correct.
You know what I meant.

Philippines may pick the Super T as a light CAS platform:

http://www.janes.com/article/64358/philippines-set-to-re-launch-bid-to-acquire-close-air-support-aircraft

The requirements the PI set out favor the Super T, how the hell is it a $140+ billion AF can find 1.2% of its budget to fund a low risk LAAR / OA-29?

100 A-29s at $14 million per tail, conservatively planning $1,000 per flight hour (double the advertised cost) and programming 3,000 hours per tail per year (way more than you would actually fly) would easily cover the acquisition, program stand up, operational utilization, bed down, etc...

A 5th gen will cost about $105k+ per flight hour for an OIR type mission.  We have to stop taking crazy pills and thinking this is the way to fight these kinds of conflicts.

 

[Lawman]

Philippines may pick the Super T as a light CAS platform:
http://www.janes.com/article/64358/philippines-set-to-re-launch-bid-to-acquire-close-air-support-aircraft
The requirements the PI set out favor the Super T, how the hell is it a $140+ billion AF can find 1.2% of its budget to fund a low risk LAAR / OA-29?
100 A-29s at $14 million per tail, conservatively planning $1,000 per flight hour (double the advertised cost) and programming 3,000 hours per tail per year (way more than you would actually fly) would easily cover the acquisition, program stand up, operational utilization, bed down, etc...
A 5th gen will cost about $105k+ per flight hour for an OIR type mission.  We have to stop taking crazy pills and thinking this is the way to fight these kinds of conflicts.
 

May pick?

They've been putting the A-29 on a pedestal as the replacement for their Broncos for years. When you write a acquisition requirements list by literally Copy/Paste it from the Super T sales page that kinda happens.

By the way... they aren't getting them for anywhere near 14 mil a tail. Last number I saw was getting to the point you could see them buying used jets if they could actually afford to keep and feed them.


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[Clark Griswold]

1 hour ago, Lawman said:

May pick?

They've been putting the A-29 on a pedestal as the replacement for their Broncos for years. When you write a acquisition requirements list by literally Copy/Paste it from the Super T sales page that kinda happens.

By the way... they aren't getting them for anywhere near 14 mil a tail. Last number I saw was getting to the point you could see them buying used jets if they could actually afford to keep and feed them.

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That blatant?  Not in FMS so I have no inside baseball to draw on, 14 mil a copy seemed reasonable but it is not the real number then...

On OA-X... found a summary article written on the main offerings, gives some additional details and seems fairly propaganda free, still caveat emptor...

https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.ojts6rihw

[Lawman]

That blatant?  Not in FMS so I have no inside baseball to draw on, 14 mil a copy seemed reasonable but it is not the real number then...
On OA-X... found a summary article written on the main offerings, gives some additional details and seems fairly propaganda free, still caveat emptor...
https://warisboring.com/the-pentagon-has-two-choices-for-light-attack-planes-2e4306197b1e#.ojts6rihw

It's funny how they don't even have the plane in their Air Force but there are pictures of it in Philippine colors and expensive wooden models same all over flag offices at Villamore...

They don't even want to know aircraft like Air Tractor or AT-6 exist. That thing is already bought to them, it's just waiting to prerequisite time since getting FA-50 was priority 1 and to see if they can shake some AvFid money out of us which with the new leadership over there doesn't look likely.


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[Clark Griswold]

On October 6, 2016 at 11:17 PM, Lawman said:

...if they can shake some AvFid money out of us which with the new leadership over there doesn't look likely.
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Yup - don't see that check from Uncle Sugar Daddy anytime soon after whatever foot-in-the mouth moment Duterte has done this week...

On the idea of Observation as new or re-discovered skill or art for an OA-X platform... as most great military aircraft are built around the actual weapon or mission system, what would you build a great Observation / Light Strike aircraft around?  

Ideally, a new EO/IR sensor with a very wide field of view, as that may be a bridge too far since OA-X would have to stay on a tight, modest budget as it is not an F-35... adapt technology currently available but organically operated together on one platform for Observation, ISR and PED seamless between customer and provider... so you need a platform to do carry all that to the high ground, stay there as the company, team, unit, etc... operates and you support...

While it is not in production now, for a contract Beech would probably figure out a way to make new ones or used ones like new again, I would suggest a Beech 1900 (C or D model), Algerian AF is already operating them, it has what Boeing is pitching for JSTARS replacement, SWaP-C, size, weight power and cooling.  the 1900 would be just the right size, sts.

OA-X:

Multiple EO/IR sensors with an additional sensor capability for self cross cue.  1 all WX sensor.

2 hard points, MIL STD 1760 bus capability.  Hellfire / SDB primary weapons.

Lots of radios but keep it real, probably 6 is enough; voice, data and link with BFT.  

Exploitation capability on board, crew position and dedicated station for keeping score, watching the re-play for advising GFC, if tasked.

Built, trained and employed for 6 hour missions, after that replace on station or call in the droids.

Algerian AF 1900, this could be a starting point for OA-X:

http://defence-blog.com/aviation/photo-of-raytheon-beech-1900d-multi-mission-surveillance-aircraft-by-algerian-air-force.html

http://www.jetmods.com/photos_beech1900.html

 

[nsplayr]

14 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

On the idea of Observation as new or re-discovered skill or art for an OA-X platform... 

OA-X:

Multiple EO/IR sensors with an additional sensor capability for self cross cue.  1 all WX sensor.

2 hard points, MIL STD 1760 bus capability.  Hellfire / SDB primary weapons.

Lots of radios but keep it real, probably 6 is enough; voice, data and link with BFT.  

Exploitation capability on board, crew position and dedicated station for keeping score, watching the re-play for advising GFC, if tasked.

Built, trained and employed for 6 hour missions, after that replace on station or call in the droids.

A lot of what you're talking about as "new" or "re-discovered" has already been executed for hundreds of thousands of hours downrange in all of the recent conflicts.  The rest has been discussed at the highest levels of the AF and the key players are well aware of the capes the defense industry is capable of providing.

I'm not sure if you're really turning over any new leaves here but A for effort?

Edited October 8, 2016 by nsplayr

[Clark Griswold]

A lot of what you're talking about as "new" or "re-discovered" has already been executed for hundreds of thousands of hours downrange in all of the recent conflicts.  The rest has been discussed at the highest levels of the AF and the key players are well aware of the capes the defense industry is capable of providing.
I'm not sure if you're really turning over any new leaves here but A for effort?

Observation not exactly ISR at least not as we have become accustomed to it usually being performed

True mult sensor ISR is already deployed but not as an organic part of the ground maneuver element - I think that is what the article in the OP is advocating for and I think should be explored

Just because the VDL can link a TOC ISR cell to a mission doesn't mean they should - you become voice directed RPA. Maybe that is a point for the GFC's to fight but if the AF wants this potential mission the argument has to be made and incorporated as doctrine

It is not without merit as we face more capable adversaries in non state actors they may challenge our EM capabilities and require us to operate differently


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[nsplayr]

I guess I just disagree with the OP on the "observation" role being that unique or really necessary.  A lot of the fighting that the light attack aircraft could accomplish isn't in direct support of a boots-on-the-ground groundforce.  Tons of work in Iraq/Afghanistan/Somalia/Yemen/Libya/Philippines/Mali/Burkina Faso/et al could be done where the U.S. has little to no ground presence.  And if/when we do have boots on the ground, it's not cosmic or unheard of to chop an air asset to that specific ground element, especially if they're playing for one of the varsity squads.

I also disagree that current multi-sensor ISR isn't being used as an "organic part of the ground maneuver element," I've done it personally - TACON to a particular GFC for an extended period of time.  All the pluses gained with familiarity and building relationships, although in a large theater, that's not a particularly efficient way to utilize a $10-15m+ asset.

Finally, I disagree that sending FMV + metadata BLOS to a JOC makes you a "voice-directed RPA;" not if you're doing it right and have the trust of the GFC, the FSO and their ITCs.

So basically I don't see a whole lot of "newness" in what OA-X is supposed to accomplish per Pako's article linked in the OP.  I've see a lot of forced novelty from the patch/DARPA/PhD set because those guys are basically required to come up with dissertations that break new ground, it's the same problem academia has writ large.  Not every budding Professor of Air Warfare with multiple patches on his shoulders actually thinks up something new and important, although they're required to write as if they had.

OA-X should be a lowish-cost way to combine some of the best aspects of the MQ-9, U-28, and fast-movers.  A crew aircraft with lots of radios/datalinks/sensors/weapons that still has legs and multi-int fusion capability that can be flown for less than an arm and a leg per hour would have done a lot of good over the last 15 years and would do a lot of good going forward.

The above-mentioned aircraft all have pieces of that puzzle - this platform I think would just consolidate and give commanders a 1-stop shop that doesn't have the some of the same limitations of the others.

BL: we don't have to reinvent the wheel, just combine a few things that already work into one platform and unleash it on all the assholes populating the garden spots of the world.

[busdriver]

While everyone is day dreaming about cheap planes. Don't forget to dream up some cheap munitions.

[magnetfreezer]

18 minutes ago, nsplayr said:

I guess I just disagree with the OP on the "observation" role being that unique or really necessary.  A lot of the fighting that the light attack aircraft could accomplish isn't in direct support of a boots-on-the-ground groundforce.  Tons of work in Iraq/Afghanistan/Somalia/Yemen/Libya/Philippines/Mali/Burkina Faso/et al could be done where the U.S. has little to no ground presence.  And if/when we do have boots on the ground, it's not cosmic or unheard of to chop an air asset to that specific ground element, especially if they're playing for one of the varsity squads.

I also disagree that current multi-sensor ISR isn't being used as an "organic part of the ground maneuver element," I've done it personally - TACON to a particular GFC for an extended period of time.  All the pluses gained with familiarity and building relationships, although in a large theater, that's not a particularly efficient way to utilize a $10-15m+ asset.

Finally, I disagree that sending FMV + metadata BLOS to a JOC makes you a "voice-directed RPA;" not if you're doing it right and have the trust of the GFC, the FSO and their ITCs.

So basically I don't see a whole lot of "newness" in what OA-X is supposed to accomplish per Pako's article linked in the OP.  I've see a lot of forced novelty from the patch/DARPA/PhD set because those guys are basically required to come up with dissertations that break new ground, it's the same problem academia has writ large.  Not every budding Professor of Air Warfare with multiple patches on his shoulders actually thinks up something new and important, although they're required to write as if they had.

OA-X should be a lowish-cost way to combine some of the best aspects of the MQ-9, U-28, and fast-movers.  A crew aircraft with lots of radios/datalinks/sensors/weapons that still has legs and multi-int fusion capability that can be flown for less than an arm and a leg per hour would have done a lot of good over the last 15 years and would do a lot of good going forward.

The above-mentioned aircraft all have pieces of that puzzle - this platform I think would just consolidate and give commanders a 1-stop shop that doesn't have the some of the same limitations of the others.

BL: we don't have to reinvent the wheel, just combine a few things that already work into one platform and unleash it on all the assholes populating the garden spots of the world.

Being TACON to the "varsity squad" is way different than working with the regular GFCs. The BLOS tie in to regular C2, ISRD, and the CAOC does make you a voice-directed RPA.

[Clark Griswold]

2 hours ago, nsplayr said:

I guess I just disagree with the OP on the "observation" role being that unique or really necessary.  A lot of the fighting that the light attack aircraft could accomplish isn't in direct support of a boots-on-the-ground groundforce.  Tons of work in Iraq/Afghanistan/Somalia/Yemen/Libya/Philippines/Mali/Burkina Faso/et al could be done where the U.S. has little to no ground presence.  And if/when we do have boots on the ground, it's not cosmic or unheard of to chop an air asset to that specific ground element, especially if they're playing for one of the varsity squads.

I also disagree that current multi-sensor ISR isn't being used as an "organic part of the ground maneuver element," I've done it personally - TACON to a particular GFC for an extended period of time.  All the pluses gained with familiarity and building relationships, although in a large theater, that's not a particularly efficient way to utilize a $10-15m+ asset.

Finally, I disagree that sending FMV + metadata BLOS to a JOC makes you a "voice-directed RPA;" not if you're doing it right and have the trust of the GFC, the FSO and their ITCs.

So basically I don't see a whole lot of "newness" in what OA-X is supposed to accomplish per Pako's article linked in the OP.  I've see a lot of forced novelty from the patch/DARPA/PhD set because those guys are basically required to come up with dissertations that break new ground, it's the same problem academia has writ large.  Not every budding Professor of Air Warfare with multiple patches on his shoulders actually thinks up something new and important, although they're required to write as if they had.

OA-X should be a lowish-cost way to combine some of the best aspects of the MQ-9, U-28, and fast-movers.  A crew aircraft with lots of radios/datalinks/sensors/weapons that still has legs and multi-int fusion capability that can be flown for less than an arm and a leg per hour would have done a lot of good over the last 15 years and would do a lot of good going forward.

The above-mentioned aircraft all have pieces of that puzzle - this platform I think would just consolidate and give commanders a 1-stop shop that doesn't have the some of the same limitations of the others.

BL: we don't have to reinvent the wheel, just combine a few things that already work into one platform and unleash it on all the assholes populating the garden spots of the world.

Fair enough, disagreement is healthy.  When all the talk is only in one direction, we never step back and evolve if appropriate. 

I think I understand what he is trying to get across with his article on articulating the concept of "Observation" and I echo your point on military academia publishing for fear of perishing, those papers are not always worth it... 

It should be a one stop shop for ISR, PED, Comm, Light kinetic, etc... and the key is for it to be in one right sized platform that doesn't need AR, doesn't need to be cued from another sensor platform necessarily, has some legs but doesn't try to match an RPA in persistence and can deliver a right sized kinetic effect without putting itself into the WEZ of likely to encountered threats...  all this without breaking the bank in operational cost, development risk and acquisition.  

Commuter turboprop in the 19-30 passenger range or repurposed small MPA would be my suggestion.  Keeps cost in the 2k or less per flight hour, acquisition likely in the 25 mil or less range and enough capacity for all the gear without having to finagle it and some room for growth in weight, power required, etc.

The distinction has to be made in who is controlling the mission and how big the information loop is, does the ITC need to be in it?  Rhetorically asked but I think that is one of the questions inferred by the OP article.

Build a family of systems to fight this war Big Blue rather than showing up with hardware too expensive to operate in these persistent, long marathons to keep the barbarians from over running the tenuous at best governments we support, rightly or wrongly.  CSAF believes we are in for another 15 years of this, plan accordingly.

AT-6B, A-29 or Scorpion for LAAR.  OA-X for LASO (Light Attack, Surveillance & Observation).  MQ-9 ERs for extreme persistence ISR / surgical strike.  

Everything can do ISR / Observation, everything can strike, everything is relatively cheap to operate.  

Edited October 9, 2016 by Clark Griswold

[nsplayr]

^^ agree with all of this 

[Lawman]

The unfortunate thing is I don't think there is a 100% honest effort to get the high speed racehorse hardware completely out of the fight.

There is too much buy in that comes from being part of whatever is going on to then use in PM offices to request money.

Let's face it the second something like A-10 stops doing these little wars the last real proof we can't live without them goes away.


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[nsplayr]

Fact.  I'm 99% convinced a big part of why we haven't funded a light attack-type aircraft is so we can "use up" the 4th gen fighters, thus justifying the need for a large 5th gen buy.

Every time an F-16 does NTISR, a fairy loses her wings, but a huge F-35 purchase looks more and more inevitable...

[Clark Griswold]

Fact.  I'm 99% convinced a big part of why we haven't funded a light attack-type aircraft is so we can "use up" the 4th gen fighters, thus justifying the need for a large 5th gen buy.
Every time an F-16 does NTISR, a fairy loses her wings, but a huge F-35 purchase looks more and more inevitable...

Truth


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