AF Stuck on Denial?

[Clark Griswold]

Worth a read

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/stuck-on-denial-part-i-the-u-s-air-force-and-stealth/

[brabus]

Interesting article. However, it still reeks of the standard anti-stealth/f35 article that loves to point out a spoon rest can detect LO platforms, but chooses to ignore the multitude of capabilities these aircraft (22 and 35) have besides a low dB (and ignores the current benefits of LO we still enjoy). These are not niche  aircraft like the 117, as the author incorrectly implies. Even the haters of the air dominance mafia who loathe the 15C as a single mission aircraft still should recognize the 22 is not a single role fighter in the sense the 15C is, despite the fact it's primary "traditional" missions are escort and DCA. LO still provides a useful capability, and I would agree with the author if our last two fighters were niche like the 117, but they're not, and on top of that they are far better than the air frames they're designed to replace (this does not include the claim the 35 replaces the a10).

[MooseAg03]

I think it makes a lot of good points. Talking with the sensor operators I fly with who cross trained from maintenance, the upkeep in LO aircraft alone makes them a huge headache and much more expensive. Why would we want every aircraft to be stealth? The current budget environment absolutely does not allow for all of our fighter aircraft to be stealth in the future. We have to find cheaper alternatives for when penetrating denied airspace is not required.

RPAs are great for some missions, but there are those times when you need a pilot for decision making and SA but an F-35/F-22 would be overkill. I just read yesterday that software issues with F-35 radar will delay it another year. We need to be looking at other, cheaper options.

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[MD]

Just some article observations..

"Operational in 1983, it was not publically revealed until April 1990"

The 117 was shown at the Nellis airshow in 1990, but was technically publically revealed in 1988 in a pentagon press conference.

"It was not a fighter, but a light bomber without a scintilla of air-to-air capability"

Not operationally, no. But not exactly true either.  Each bomb bay did have AIM-9 umbilical connections, marked as such, for a reason.

Regarding Spoon Rest/Fan Song/Tall King, about the only thing I'll say on that is since we planned specifically against fixed threats/radars, we had methodology to make detection by these systems nearly impossible.

We carried LGBs, but also had GPS weapons too, so we weren't completely dependant on the former. And in terms of defenses onboard, there were items, just nothing standard.

"No F-117s were so much as scratched by Iraqi defenses"

One was very nearly shot down by medium/heavy caliber AAA that was tracking it visually.  Luckily no hits were made.

"No accident this; Col. Dani’s battery also shot down an F-16C, making him the only successful air defense commander of the entire conflict"

Not entirely specialization on the part of the Serb SAM operators either. We ourselves helped them out alot with not remembering a damn thing from the first days Linebacker II, 27 years earlier. Nothing like helping the IADS narrow down its search area.

In terms of maintenance, the 117 was up there in man hours. As mentioned, the Martians had the most difficult job in just maintaining the RAM coating. One of the things you'll notice in looking at day-to-day 117s, is how the jet looks somewhat ratty looking, and with strips/pieces missing underneath the tail number of the vertical stab, as well as white chalk looking stuff around the cockpit. This was not the fault of any kind of maintenance, but merely a limitation of the jet itself.

F-117s at home station were not kept in a full CMR status. Their weapons attack systems were fully ready, but the jets themselves had to be prepared for combat if the call came, in terms of the stealth items and specifically the RAM coating. With these first generation stealth jets, the outer coating on the jet....the RAM, or Radar Absorbent Material.....came in "sheets" and had to be placed onto the metal fuselage of the jet by trimming to fit, then gluing into place, with a fairly long curing time. Because of this, bits and pieces of of RAM would come off inflight often, and it was alot of work to maintain it. To do so would have far too many jets down for service, so RAM was only replaced in larger sheets if need be. Smaller areas of missing RAM were either left missng temporarily until maintenance could get to it, or were filled in with the RAM putty, resulting in the worn look that some of the jets had, even though that was only a look. When off to combat or to an exercise like Red Flag (or an airshow), the jets were fully prepped and looked pristine, with their RAM coating perfect and Radar Cross Section for that particular tail number well within specs.  Other things that would cause severe loss of RAM were actions like dropping the tailhook, if needed.
 

 

Edited March 25, 2016 by MD

[Clark Griswold]

Good conversation and thanks MD for the backstory on the 117.

I can't help but agree somewhat with the author the pursuit of an all LO fighter fleet (and possibly bomber) has not been the best COA as it has probably driven acquisition decisions that have kept other capabilities from fruition.  Lower end capabilities probably but are ones that are needed to meet CCDR requirements inexpensively (relatively) and immediately.

An LO fleet is needed: fighter, bomber, recce, UAS and LO CSAR/SOF along with LO tanker/airlift capability (just my opinion) but not the entire fleet.  An AF not necessarily divided evenly but appropriately between very high end LO assets, conventional 4+ gen systems and COIN / Low Intensity Conflict assets would be a good mixed fleet, tailored capabilities for a diverse set of missions. 

We kinda sorta have that now just by the sheer cost of some 5th gen / Stealth systems limiting their numbers but we should have made this strategic decision, not just the AF but all branches to build forces for the new reality of some threats of high end conflicts but the most likely ones requiring less expensive less capable systems for more cost effective methods of delivering military effects. 

[brabus]

Why would we want every aircraft to be stealth? The current budget environment absolutely does not allow for all of our fighter aircraft to be stealth in the future.

4TH Gen fighters will be around through 2045, so we're not planning for a f22/f35 only force. Who knows what 6 Gen will end up looking like at this point.

 

[MooseAg03]

Why would we want every aircraft to be stealth? The current budget environment absolutely does not allow for all of our fighter aircraft to be stealth in the future.

4TH Gen fighters will be around through 2045, so we're not planning for a f22/f35 only force. Who knows what 6 Gen will end up looking like at this point.

 

I'm sure they will all be LO in some form or another. We should look at a high end and low end combined option (2 different airframes). Something tells me with the better technology that's out there, we could design a better F-16 today. The generals all talk of 4th & 4.5 gen fighters being obsolete on the battlefield in the next decade, but not every fight will need stealth as we see today.

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[Clark Griswold]

On March 26, 2016 at 9:38 PM, MooseAg03 said:

not every fight will need stealth as we see today.

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Yup 

To fly a mission in OIR with a Scorpion Jet assuming a 6 hour mission, assuming $3K per flight hour, is $18K where that same mission performed by a F-16 (keeping it single ship apples to apples comparison) and assuming a $10K per hour cost (very conservative) and then assuming it would need two ARs for ingress-patrol-recovery and a 5 hour tanker mission to cover that at $15K (again conservative) that comes to $135K to fly that mission in a mostly permissive AOR but both by the capabilities of the aircraft, sensors, weapons and their ROE would deliver a weapon or conduct ISR outside the WEZ of most realistic threats so using the high end system to deliver the same effect is of little operational benefit and significant cost.

To quote Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC, "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."  It is the logistics & costs of these sustained long term operations consisting of not just kinetic military effects but persistent ISR (and the huge PED tail to make any use of what is collected) that should drive the unimaginative AF to adapt and change when the model of how it did things in the past in operations that were quite different is just too damn expensive for what we actually do now and are likely to do a lot more of in the future.

Going back to the bar napkin math I dreamed up, you save $117k per mission, assume you fly 25 missions a day with 2 FOLs and you save daily over $2.9 million.  That's not even considering the huge savings in logistical footprint by reduction from flying/supporting fewer types, aircraft not needing AR, etc...  $2.9 mil a day at one year comes to $1 billion per year, that pays for 50 Scorpion Jets in a year.  Not even figuring in the extra costs of the reduced footprint, service life extended by saving hours on fighters by not using them for these types of operations, etc... 

You save a billion here and a billion there and eventually you save real money in Pentagon terms... then you can buy nice toys.

[Lawman]

not every fight will need stealth as we see today.

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Yup

To fly a mission in OIR with a Scorpion Jet assuming a 6 hour mission, assuming $3K per flight hour, is $18K where that same mission performed by a F-16 (keeping it single ship apples to apples comparison) and assuming a $10K per hour cost (very conservative) and then assuming it would need two ARs for ingress-patrol-recovery and a 5 hour tanker mission to cover that at $15K (again conservative) that comes to $135K to fly that mission in a mostly permissive AOR but both by the capabilities of the aircraft, sensors, weapons and their ROE would deliver a weapon or conduct ISR outside the WEZ of most realistic threats so using the high end system to deliver the same effect is of little operational benefit and significant cost.

To quote Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC, "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics." It is the logistics & costs of these sustained long term operations consisting of not just kinetic military effects but persistent ISR (and the huge PED tail to make any use of what is collected) that should drive the unimaginative AF to adapt and change when the model of how it did things in the past in operations that were quite different is just too damn expensive for what we actually do now and are likely to do a lot more of in the future.

Going back to the bar napkin math I dreamed up, you save $117k per mission, assume you fly 25 missions a day with 2 FOLs and you save daily over $2.9 million. That's not even considering the huge savings in logistical footprint by reduction from flying/supporting fewer types, aircraft not needing AR, etc... $2.9 mil a day at one year comes to $1 billion per year, that pays for 50 Scorpion Jets in a year. Not even figuring in the extra costs of the reduced footprint, service life extended by saving hours on fighters by not using them for these types of operations, etc...

You save a billion here and a billion there and eventually you save real money in Pentagon terms... then you can buy nice toys.

By all accounts the Iraqi AF just lost a Caravan conducting a Hellfire strike to ISIS AAA.

Outside of Afghanistan where the biggest gun is probably a

And while yes Scorpion and other type airplane's absolutely win the cost to use argument they are virtually useless until after the major fighting is over. That means that while they are extremely well suited to rearming an Iraqi or other type Air Force they shouldn't be looked at as a good idea for us to go launching offensives with. Which is exactly why I fully support money to the AVFID program that does exactly that, get their crappy Air Force to perform its own ISR and CAS under our direction to help them find their ass with an extra hand.

The much larger overall unaccounted for cost of putting a small turboprop/jet at airports within the AOR is them requiring a much larger and more expensive security cost. And it's an exponential curve. You need patrols outside the wire to maintain your logistics. You need a QRF that can do something about the 122mm rockets and mortars that keep coming on daily repetition (anybody been to Shank?). The second you start taking casualties on the ground the dollars saved argument dries up much less the loss of an aircraft. When you are talking about half million dollar vehicles lost full of ground bubbas to an IED and the beating to morale that a unit losing guys to ambushes and IDF has to endure the dollars for a couple weeks of having Viper and a Tanker on the ATO look cheap.

[di1630]

Geezus, even if we had a fleet of cost effective coin aircraft, our inept leadership would send F-35s + every other asset anyways. Gotta prove they are worth it, send a message. Anyone know how much it costs per hour to use the F-22 as an ISR asset or send F-15C's across the pond?

If the vipers, mud hens tankers etc weren't in Syria, they'd still be flying home station.

Again, F-22s for hi end a/a, F-35s for -16 replacement to do a bit of everything when needed, hogs for hi-end CAS.

[nsplayr]

Big blue has zero incentive to save service-life hours on the 4th gen fighters. We need to "use them up" in order to justify the F-35.

[Lawman]

Big blue has zero incentive to save service-life hours on the 4th gen fighters. We need to "use them up" in order to justify the F-35.

Unfortunately that's true of pretty much every government agency at this point.

[Dupe]

16 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

You save a billion here and a billion there and eventually you save real money in Pentagon terms... then you can buy nice toys.

 

This is sadly untrue. Saving current year operations (or worse...OCO) funds will not net extra aqusition dollars in future years.

 

Our system exists on the continuous acquisition of new toys and spending all current operations funds.

Edited March 27, 2016 by Dupe

[sqwatch]

The 5th gen haters routinely ignore the threat of double digit SAMs, which have become more ubiquitous and arguably the standard for denying us air superiority. Why do we need 5th gen? So my ass isn't a smokin hole when Uncle Sam tells me orbit inside an SA-10 MEZ.

[Sprkt69]

17 hours ago, Lawman said:

By all accounts the Iraqi AF just lost a Caravan conducting a Hellfire strike to ISIS AAA.

Outside of Afghanistan where the biggest gun is probably a

And while yes Scorpion and other type airplane's absolutely win the cost to use argument they are virtually useless until after the major fighting is over. That means that while they are extremely well suited to rearming an Iraqi or other type Air Force they shouldn't be looked at as a good idea for us to go launching offensives with. Which is exactly why I fully support money to the AVFID program that does exactly that, get their crappy Air Force to perform its own ISR and CAS under our direction to help them find their ass with an extra hand.

The much larger overall unaccounted for cost of putting a small turboprop/jet at airports within the AOR is them requiring a much larger and more expensive security cost. And it's an exponential curve. You need patrols outside the wire to maintain your logistics. You need a QRF that can do something about the 122mm rockets and mortars that keep coming on daily repetition (anybody been to Shank?). The second you start taking casualties on the ground the dollars saved argument dries up much less the loss of an aircraft. When you are talking about half million dollar vehicles lost full of ground bubbas to an IED and the beating to morale that a unit losing guys to ambushes and IDF has to endure the dollars for a couple weeks of having Viper and a Tanker on the ATO look cheap.

An interesting take but I disagree with your assessment about security costs, esp if you have rotor wing assets forward deployed as nothing drastically changes security wise aside from extra fuel, spares and munitions that need to be shipped to the FOB. What you gain is better support at a cheaper cost. Doesn't the Army always complain about "Where is my air?!?" 

[Lawman]

By all accounts the Iraqi AF just lost a Caravan conducting a Hellfire strike to ISIS AAA.

Outside of Afghanistan where the biggest gun is probably a

And while yes Scorpion and other type airplane's absolutely win the cost to use argument they are virtually useless until after the major fighting is over. That means that while they are extremely well suited to rearming an Iraqi or other type Air Force they shouldn't be looked at as a good idea for us to go launching offensives with. Which is exactly why I fully support money to the AVFID program that does exactly that, get their crappy Air Force to perform its own ISR and CAS under our direction to help them find their ass with an extra hand.

The much larger overall unaccounted for cost of putting a small turboprop/jet at airports within the AOR is them requiring a much larger and more expensive security cost. And it's an exponential curve. You need patrols outside the wire to maintain your logistics. You need a QRF that can do something about the 122mm rockets and mortars that keep coming on daily repetition (anybody been to Shank?). The second you start taking casualties on the ground the dollars saved argument dries up much less the loss of an aircraft. When you are talking about half million dollar vehicles lost full of ground bubbas to an IED and the beating to morale that a unit losing guys to ambushes and IDF has to endure the dollars for a couple weeks of having Viper and a Tanker on the ATO look cheap.

An interesting take but I disagree with your assessment about security costs, esp if you have rotor wing assets forward deployed as nothing drastically changes security wise aside from extra fuel, spares and munitions that need to be shipped to the FOB. What you gain is better support at a cheaper cost. Doesn't the Army always complain about "Where is my air?!?" 

That's the problem though. Once you start committing ground forces in a number that requires 30 million dollar gunships to provide 24 hour ops (because that's normal in Afghanistan and therefore should be everywhere) you piss away all the savings.

Base security and ownership of the battle space becomes this never ending exponential monster. Suddenly the requirements turn into the justification for further requirements until it becomes a giant self licking ice cream cone that serves nothing but its self. That's one of the few times that non ground intensive air campaigns actually look cheaper from a dollars both in the literal and the political impact standpoint.

[Clark Griswold]

21 hours ago, Lawman said:

By all accounts the Iraqi AF just lost a Caravan conducting a Hellfire strike to ISIS AAA.

Outside of Afghanistan where the biggest gun is probably a

And while yes Scorpion and other type airplane's absolutely win the cost to use argument they are virtually useless until after the major fighting is over. That means that while they are extremely well suited to rearming an Iraqi or other type Air Force they shouldn't be looked at as a good idea for us to go launching offensives with. Which is exactly why I fully support money to the AVFID program that does exactly that, get their crappy Air Force to perform its own ISR and CAS under our direction to help them find their ass with an extra hand.

The much larger overall unaccounted for cost of putting a small turboprop/jet at airports within the AOR is them requiring a much larger and more expensive security cost. And it's an exponential curve. You need patrols outside the wire to maintain your logistics. You need a QRF that can do something about the 122mm rockets and mortars that keep coming on daily repetition (anybody been to Shank?). The second you start taking casualties on the ground the dollars saved argument dries up much less the loss of an aircraft. When you are talking about half million dollar vehicles lost full of ground bubbas to an IED and the beating to morale that a unit losing guys to ambushes and IDF has to endure the dollars for a couple weeks of having Viper and a Tanker on the ATO look cheap.

Article on the Iraqi Caravan shootdown

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3495947/Horrifying-video-shows-moment-Iraqi-plane-went-shot-sky-ISIS-extremists-anti-aircraft-gun.html

It was a 57mm that shot them down, the Caravan could not realistically operate outside the WEZ of it but a Scorpion Jet could even if it was radar guided using open source max ranges, anyway we've used COIN aircraft in non-permissive environments (A-1s in Vietnam for example) - that doesn't mean we put them right in the WEZ of a SAM or only 25 NM from a Red Air threat but they have a role to play even in major combat ops, behind the FEBA but still useful and when the threat is removed, go to work boys... also if we can put an ALQ-188 EW pod on a 38 for a better adversary trainer then I am confident that a pod for a Scorpion Jet could be found for self-protection from radar guided threats if it was used during major combat ops or in a hybrid AOR like Syria from Russian or Syrian conventional forces...

No disagreement on the importance of Building Partner Capacity and particularly the AVFID piece but we will need to keep our own capabilities to not only train these missions but to perform them also.  What if no government or military exists and we are starting from scratch?  Essentially the case with Afghanistan, until whatever fledgling state we are building or nursing back to health can at least stand on wobbly legs, we will be delivering the air power for several years... 

The cost piece of the has to be considered and I am not for scrimping on base defenses, equipment or manpower for the brave souls that go outside the wire on a routine basis, but if we can't find some efficiencies, better ways of delivering military effects in these fights, etc... then we're screwed for getting the very modern high end forces of the future, current ops will just eat away any money for modernization/acquisition - different color of money argument doesn't matter either as the pols take money from the future to pay for today, that is one of the reasons the F-22 was cut to an only 187 aircraft buy, we keep spending 10-15 million a day in OIR fighting ISIS and after Congress gets that bill the desire to fork out another 80 billion for a new bomber no matter how bad someone says we need it is going to probably get another look...

6 hours ago, Dupe said:

This is sadly untrue. Saving current year operations (or worse...OCO) funds will not net extra acquisition dollars in future years.

Our system exists on the continuous acquisition of new toys and spending all current operations funds.

True but the case could be made to Congress in the naive hope of penetrating their shields of ignorance and parochial mindset that the AF has a good strategy with acquiring less expensive planes to fly and fight with in the conflicts we are in now so Congress could / would spend more in the future (or better yet now) on new higher end airplanes / systems for the wars we might have to fight with peer adversaries.  

I wonder if there was no OCO (there shouldn't be) and it was all (our portion) rolled into the baseline for the AF (as mainly O&M) if this would give a market incentive for the AF to find less expensive ways of putting a JDAM on a mud hut, that is if you could shift O&M you saved to a multi year Acquisition Account to realize your savings, this has been the dream of many a Mr. Smith but I think it could work as it still will spend the money so Congressmen with military contractors or subs in their districts should like it as it feeds their constituents and in reality feeds them earlier and often 

4 hours ago, sqwatch said:

The 5th gen haters routinely ignore the threat of double digit SAMs, which have become more ubiquitous and arguably the standard for denying us air superiority. Why do we need 5th gen? So my ass isn't a smokin hole when Uncle Sam tells me orbit inside an SA-10 MEZ.

No hate for the 5th gen just doubt we need as much of it as we are trying to get 

If we are just talking Fighters then my ideal AF would be 3 parts, a high end based on F-22s & FB-22s; a medium end based on a new 4+ gen fighter like Advanced Capability Superhornet and a successor to the A-10 and lower end based on Scorpion Jets and probably Pred-Cs - just a very rough overview but three levels of ass-kicking at three levels of cost, use as required...

Edited March 28, 2016 by Clark Griswold

[Dupe]

2 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

...acquiring less expensive planes to fly and fight with in the conflicts we are in now so Congress could / would spend more in the future 

 if you could shift O&M you saved to a multi year Acquisition Account to realize your savings, 

 

Think of the politics. Any Representative who voted for less current year spending at the expense of his home district (even for the "promise" of future year programs) would get eaten alive come election time. These folks get elected every two years, so their goal is short term spending and not long-term gain. 

Federal law does not allow us to parlay current year savings into future year aquisitions for exactly the reason above. I see no push to change that anywhere on the horizon. 

The Air Force definitely should strengthen the low-end capability, as those are the conflicts we are almost sure to fight. I think buying COTS, leasing, and choosing aircraft that already are proven should be part of this strategy.

Edited March 28, 2016 by Dupe

[di1630]

The 5th gen haters routinely ignore the threat of double digit SAMs, which have become more ubiquitous and arguably the standard for denying us air superiority. Why do we need 5th gen? So my ass isn't a smokin hole when Uncle Sam tells me orbit inside an SA-10 MEZ.

Hey dude, your not gonna orbit inside a double digit SAM MEZ whether you are in a F-35, F-22 or B-2 etc.

There is some real misperceptions about what stealth offers and how.

The L.O. Is simply going to shrink the detection range (at certain aspect angles).

Double digit SAMS have been around for going on 40 years. They didn't become a big talking point until they were needed to sell the F-35.

5th gen may get closer to and detect the Double digit SAM threat earlier but you can jam or hide from barrage fire.

We are gaining "some" access to a radar threat envelope and ignoring the bigger more likely AAA/IR threat that denies access.

I'm pretty sure though the new vision for future CAS is lobbing SDBs from 30 miles/40,000 ft at static targets.

Sounds "pretty darn good".

[Clark Griswold]

20 hours ago, Dupe said:

Think of the politics. Any Representative who voted for less current year spending at the expense of his home district (even for the "promise" of future year programs) would get eaten alive come election time. These folks get elected every two years, so their goal is short term spending and not long-term gain. 

Federal law does not allow us to parlay current year savings into future year aquisitions for exactly the reason above. I see no push to change that anywhere on the horizon. 

The Air Force definitely should strengthen the low-end capability, as those are the conflicts we are almost sure to fight. I think buying COTS, leasing, and choosing aircraft that already are proven should be part of this strategy.

Yup - our insane arrangement of short terms, campaign finance and the need for patronage to secure the first two lead to this:

Average Congressman has to raise about $2300 per day for an average campaign cost of $1.6 million; make that an average of about $14,000 per day for a Senator for an average campaign cost of $14.6 million.  Now when are you supposed to think about not only what is good for your district but good for the country when you are panhandling for dollars?

http://www.msnbc.com/hardball/how-much-does-it-cost-win-seat-congre

It sucks that we can see the problem (or one of many) with our fiscal policies that encourage waste effectively by the expiration of authority per account in a FY but there has got to be a fix that even the Hill would support, it still brings home the bacon to Congressional Districts but encourages the DoD to not waste money just to fully execute.  

 

[Cooter]

On March 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Clark Griswold said:

Yup 

To fly a mission in OIR with a Scorpion Jet assuming a 6 hour mission, assuming $3K per flight hour, is $18K where that same mission performed by a F-16 (keeping it single ship apples to apples comparison) and assuming a $10K per hour cost (very conservative) and then assuming it would need two ARs for ingress-patrol-recovery and a 5 hour tanker mission to cover that at $15K (again conservative) that comes to $135K to fly that mission in a mostly permissive AOR but both by the capabilities of the aircraft, sensors, weapons and their ROE would deliver a weapon or conduct ISR outside the WEZ of most realistic threats so using the high end system to deliver the same effect is of little operational benefit and significant cost.

To quote Gen. Robert H. Barrow, USMC, "Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."  It is the logistics & costs of these sustained long term operations consisting of not just kinetic military effects but persistent ISR (and the huge PED tail to make any use of what is collected) that should drive the unimaginative AF to adapt and change when the model of how it did things in the past in operations that were quite different is just too damn expensive for what we actually do now and are likely to do a lot more of in the future.

Going back to the bar napkin math I dreamed up, you save $117k per mission, assume you fly 25 missions a day with 2 FOLs and you save daily over $2.9 million.  That's not even considering the huge savings in logistical footprint by reduction from flying/supporting fewer types, aircraft not needing AR, etc...  $2.9 mil a day at one year comes to $1 billion per year, that pays for 50 Scorpion Jets in a year.  Not even figuring in the extra costs of the reduced footprint, service life extended by saving hours on fighters by not using them for these types of operations, etc... 

You save a billion here and a billion there and eventually you save real money in Pentagon terms... then you can buy nice toys.

Preach brother. Just wrote a brief paper on this for CGSC, albeit SOF focused, and even a dummy like me can see the benifits. If only we could convince those above that flying a $100M+ aircraft at $30K+ an hour to kill two dudes in a $20K Hilux is not the best way to do business. Cheaper, persistent, flexible and responsive...not sure where the rub is (check sarcasm detector)

Cooter

[brabus]

Big blue has zero incentive to save service-life hours on the 4th gen fighters. We need to "use them up" in order to justify the F-35.

Incorrect, the AF is dumping a lot of effort into service life extension programs (SLEP) for 4th gen, because even "they" realize we need a lot of 4th gen around to supplement 5th gen because we'll never get to an all 5th gen force, at least in the next 30 years.

Hey dude, your not gonna orbit inside a double digit SAM MEZ whether you are in a F-35, F-22 or B-2 etc.

We're doing it right now, and have been for months...in a shit hole country.  The high end threat is real and is all over; you don't need to start WWIII with China or Russia to fly in more than AAA and IR threats.

[Blue]

On 3/27/2016 at 9:01 AM, nsplayr said:

Big blue has zero incentive to save service-life hours on the 4th gen fighters. We need to "use them up" in order to justify the F-35.

 

1 hour ago, brabus said:

Incorrect, the AF is dumping a lot of effort into service life extension programs (SLEP) for 4th gen, because even "they" realize we need a lot of 4th gen around to supplement 5th gen because we'll never get to an all 5th gen force, at least in the next 30 years.

Eh, I tend to agree with nsplayr.

Big Blue will continue to burn hours on the 4th gen fighters, with no thought of trying to conserve them.

They'll SLEP the hell out of them, and then point to the "rising maintenance costs" as all the more reason to buy the latest 5th gen wonder toy.

[di1630]

Big blue has zero incentive to save service-life hours on the 4th gen fighters. We need to "use them up" in order to justify the F-35.

Incorrect, the AF is dumping a lot of effort into service life extension programs (SLEP) for 4th gen, because even "they" realize we need a lot of 4th gen around to supplement 5th gen because we'll never get to an all 5th gen force, at least in the next 30 years.

Hey dude, your not gonna orbit inside a double digit SAM MEZ whether you are in a F-35, F-22 or B-2 etc.

We're doing it right now, and have been for months...in a shit hole country.  The high end threat is real and is all over; you don't need to start WWIII with China or Russia to fly in more than AAA and IR threats.

Sorry, I meant where the double digit SAMs will actually shoot you if they can in war with weapons free air defense posture.

I am aware of what you are talking about....just not quite the scenario I am implying.

[Clark Griswold]

17 hours ago, Cooter said:

Preach brother. Just wrote a brief paper on this for CGSC, albeit SOF focused, and even a dummy like me can see the benifits. If only we could convince those above that flying a $100M+ aircraft at $30K+ an hour to kill two dudes in a $20K Hilux is not the best way to do business. Cheaper, persistent, flexible and responsive...not sure where the rub is (check sarcasm detector)

Cooter

Yup - the main thing I can't understand is why the fact that it will not need AR support to do an operationally relevant sortie (ISR, CAS, Surgical Strike, or all of them on one mission) is not breaking thru and getting more traction towards acquisition and this coming from a former tanker bubba. 

Even way back when I was a tanker co I knew that having a two ship of 16's on station with the huge tanker commitment to pass gas to them (and all the other two ships) did not make sense when you had cheaper options given the threats you actually faced, the amount of times we were going kinetic after major combat ops ended and the cost of keeping x number of tankers on station 24-7-365. 

This is a perfect plane / mission for Guard / Reserve, but like the C-27J and two brothers, if I can't have one he can't have one.