Jump to content

The Navy's Retention Problem and Lessons for the Air Force


Guest

Recommended Posts

News Commentary:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/25/sailors-leaving-navy-over-stress-on-social-issues-/#ixzz2xAoI57ef

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/03/26/admiral_we_need_to_talk_officers_white_paper_on_jos_jumping_ship_warns_navys_leader

Original USNI Article:

https://blog.usni.org/2014/03/20/keep-a-weather-eye-on-the-horizon-a-navy-officer-retention-study

The abstract:

Situation in Brief

•Continued high operational tempo after a decade of unusually long deployments

•Loss of “combat” mentality; plummeting morale and esprit de corps

•Significantly improved, and improving, economic trend lines

•Perception that operational command is not valued – and increasingly administrative

•Outflow of Boomers from workflow and influx of Millennials

•Erosion of trust in senior leadership This study takes an in-depth look at factors significantly impacting officer retention, compares them with historic retention downturns, evaluates Fortune 500 approaches for retaining talent, and provides actionable recommendations to enable us to outrun the approaching storm.

My highlights:

[...]Between 1987 and 1999, the average deployment length was approximately 180 days. The average deployment length has continued to creep steadily upwards since the attacks on September 11, 2001. By the end of fiscal year 2013 the average carrier strike group was at sea for more than 8 months at a time, ballistic missile capable surface combatants for 8 - 9 months, and submarines for 6 months. [...] All respondents – junior and senior alike – cite unreliable cruise schedules and consistently long deployments (> 7 months) as factors affecting their decision-making regarding continued naval service. In short, sustained high operational tempo is perceived as placing an incredibly large burden on servicemembers.

[...]

The revocation of critical skills bonuses for senior officers is a significant driver for our impending officer retention crisis. Without a bonus and associated service obligation to keep these senior officers in place following their O-5 command tours, many will be retirement eligible within a year of their change of command. [...] Without a bonus and associated service obligation, these commanding officers can walk immediately following their command tours. This trend is also being repeated in the special warfare community – this year marked a 500% increase in the number of post-command commanders retiring at the 20-year mark. [...] Unfortunately, metrics lag the problem and also suffer from another flaw: They only track the quantity of officers staying, not necessarily the quality of those staying. As Figure 1 indicates, the critical skills bonus for senior aviators was actually withdrawn when it was needed most – the last year it was offered was FY11 – concurrent with a marked increase in post-command retirements.[...]

Figure-1.png?resize=660%2C368

[...]

The drawdown of real-world operations in the Middle East, as well as worldwide, has removed one of the most powerful factors keeping quality officers in the Navy. Accordingly, the subsequent factors that follow will have outsized effects, since they will not be offset by morale-building participation in national crises.

[...]

[The] external message of an improving national economy comes at exactly the same time that senior military leadership is testifying about significant budget shortfalls. This juxtaposition leads the servicemember to conclude that while the future looks bright for employment outside of the service, the military is likely to remain in its present (and painful) period of budgetary contraction and downsizing.

Further impacting the national labor market is the ongoing retirement of millions of Baby Boomers. Defined as being born in the post-World War II period of 1946-1964, the first Baby Boomers started reaching 65 years of age in 2011. An increased requirement for skilled labor will accelerate as Boomers exit the workforce

[...]

Many respondents cited what they perceive as a continuing service-wide “zero-defect mentality” – bolstered by a growing number of commanding officers relieved for cause; an increasing reliance on quantitative metrics which may or may not correspond to actual mission capability; and loss of strategic direction which provides clarity to subordinates. Other examples cited include: Loss of aviation esprit de corps due to flight suit standardization, implementation of the surface warfare community’s overbearing examination process for command, and a climate of ever-increasing administrative functions [...] As Rear Admiral Ted Carter’s Task Force Resilient team discovered in 2013, [...] most efforts to eradicate suicide had a very discernable price point that, once exceeded, provided little or no additional benefit. Put simply, there is no dollar amount that can be spent, or amount of training that can be conducted, that will completely eradicate complex issues such as suicide, sexual assault, or commanding officer reliefs for cause – yet we continue to expend immense resources in this pursuit. Sailors are bombarded with annual online training, general military training, and safety stand-downs – all in an effort to combat problems that will never be defeated. The perception is that these efforts are not undertaken because they are incredibly effective, but rather because of significant political and public oversight. Respondents also note that senior leaders seem too eager to lay accountability for fixing problems at the feet of mid-level leaders without providing the commensurate authority needed to enact change, and while failing to accept the risk and provide the backing needed to support subordinates. [...] Sailors continue to cite the over-focus on social issues by senior leadership – above and beyond discussions on warfighting – a fact that demoralizes junior and mid-grade officers alike.

[...]

Beyond the redefined operational tempo/personnel tempo standards, the 2011 Enlisted Retention Board is perhaps the single largest perceived breach of trust, followed by a well-publicized reaction in the Fleet. 2,946 midcareer enlisted Sailors were discharged to manage 31 over-manned ratings, followed almost immediately by an announcement indicating a need for more Sailors. Despite being two mutually exclusive events, the Fleet largely perceived this action as a gross mismanagement of Navy manpower. [...] Other examples include the forced administrative furloughs of Navy civilians for 11 days (later reduced to six days by Secretary Hagel), comments by senior leadership that “we have to show the pain” when reducing base and installation services, saving money by shifting promotion zones and delaying officer promotions by a year, and recent “attacks” on the military pay, compensation, and pension system.

[...]

Despite tangible increases to quality of life [over the last decade,] officers and enlisted alike nervous about future impacts to the workforce. The current perception is that pay and benefits are likely to stagnate or decrease in the near future, negatively impacting retention. Secretary Hagel’s February 24, 2014 announcement regarding military pay and benefits is likely to perpetuate this fear, further fueled by media headlines like “DoD budget seeks cuts in BAH, commissary, Tricare benefits” and “Hagel to recommend deep cuts to military pay, benefits.”

[...]

[...] the upcoming August 1, 2014 Federal Aviation Administration rule change which will significantly bias Air Transport Pilot licenses towards military pilots. [...] Additional retention pressures include the 2007 changes to the mandatory retirement age for pilots, which increased the retirement age for a commercial pilot from 60 to 65 and delayed large numbers of retirements until 2013. Based on this change and overall worldwide demand, a recent estimate cited by Foreign Policy claims that 50,000 pilots or more will be needed to satisfy demand through 2024.

His recommendations follow and are essentially the inverse of the warnings listed above. Foster trust through better and more honest communications, re-instate bonuses for critical career fields/assignments, shifting focus away from administrivia/queep towards the mission, improve transparency and usability of personnel systems, and others.

Look at the annual training requirements for sailors and units. What training can have its periodicity extended? What can be eliminated altogether? Which instructions are duplicitous and can be removed?

[...]

Unifying the most important websites into a single common access card enabled portal is a relatively easy and inexpensive proposition.

He also recommends some changes to personnel processes regarding promotion and command that I believe are specific to the Navy.

In all, this was one of the best papers I've ever read on the topic. You could read the whole thing if you want, but it's about 20 pages, and I think the excerpts above capture everything relevant to the AF.

  • Upvote 4
Link to comment
Share on other sites

We're focusing two half 'safety' days on SAPR alone this coming fiscal year. Focus on suicides - 0. Almost every day someone connected to the AF (Civ, ANG, Res and AD) is killing themselves, but that's totally dropped off the leadership viewpoint.

I've got folks in my Sq who're dealing with multiple family members and friends suicides... and murders.. but nope. SAPR's what's killing us as a force. No focus on making sure my cyber Amn can see straight enough through the mental turmoil to not kill the network. Never mind the non-stop inspections, constantly updated and revived checklists from folks so far removed from the base they don't even realize some systems aren't used anymore.

Please note - I'm not saying we go full bore on any topic.. but some balance is necessary or it just gets tuned out.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Is it maybe that no commander gets fired for suicides, yet a bunch of sexual assault/harassment complaints and he would be out like a pair of rims at an LA Dodger's game?

  • Upvote 4
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Dude i so wish you would have waited until Wednesday to post this.

Why? And re the two above posts: any commander who has a subordinate or their subordinate's spouse commit or attempt suicide should have their command climate investigated. You never know which straw broke the camel's back, but I'm still inclined to blame the motherfuckers chucking hay bales.

Edited by guineapigfury
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Dude i so wish you would have waited until Wednesday to post this.

Why?

I'm guessing so it wouldn't make all the AFPC schmucks re-think approving all the VSP/TERA applicants. Ot so it would (or wouldn't) sync with April Fool's.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm guessing so it wouldn't make all the AFPC schmucks re-think approving all the VSP/TERA applicants. Ot so it would (or wouldn't) sync with April Fool's.

Exactly...last thing I need is some AFPC lurker looking at this and thinking "wait a minute..."

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm sure neither the AF nor the Navy cares...after all, they are trying to get rid of a bunch of officers, right?

I'm out meow, but from talking to buds the Bureau is doing some pretty underhanded shady shit to keep guys in longer. Apparently now going back to the RAG (RTU) to get current counts as a major training event and warrants a 2 year commitment. Getting rehacked, to do your ing job, so that you can deploy.... Requires another two years. And the Navy wonders why guys are running for the exits.

Apparently if you refuse that commitment, no more flying for you.... And enjoy the shittiest desk job in we can find for you. Leadership at its finest. Punishing the "quitters" of a volunteer force.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Google the "Boss, I quit" letter and note the date.

Same shit, different decade, although I acknowledge that it is worse now than I have ever seen.

There are actually four different "dear boss" letters that have gone around the AF in the last couple decades. Outside of a few specifics, the overall gist remains the same even if the flavor changes.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The difference is in quality of life and pay. At my first squadron, folks would volunteer for a short tour or pred to get assignment of choice following. Also the bonus was much better. I know a few that received 3 different bonuses. Looks like this will be the first yea in how long there's no pilot bonus? I can read between those lines. Things will change for the better, but it will be years not months.

Edited by FlyFastLiveSlow
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm out meow, but from talking to buds the Bureau is doing some pretty underhanded shady shit to keep guys in longer. Apparently now going back to the RAG (RTU) to get current counts as a major training event and warrants a 2 year commitment. Getting rehacked, to do your fucking job, so that you can deploy.... Requires another two years. And the Navy wonders why guys are running for the exits.

Apparently if you refuse that commitment, no more flying for you.... And enjoy the shittiest desk job in we can find for you. Leadership at its finest. Punishing the "quitters" of a volunteer force.

It might be time for a "What's wrong with the Navy?" thread so Air Force dudes will stop thinking the grass is greener.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now


×
×
  • Create New...