C-17 lands short at Dover

[Skitzo]

Man, I wonder what color "ultra-extreme" would be on an ORM worksheet. Plaid?

Isn't plaid reserved for ludicrous ORM?

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[Royal]

Isn't plaid reserved for ludicrous ORM?

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yes, this is true.

Ultra-extreme is sanguine with subtle tones of ecru; they modeled it after the color crews said they saw right before their careers ended.

[pcola]

It seems a ton of people are looking at ORM from the wrong vantage point. The ORM is your tool, not TACCs. It is your "get out of jail free" card (if used before you actually go to jail.) It gives you the leverage to alter your day without pulling the "safety of flight" card. Mark up the ORM to the level you feel appropriate. Then call TACC with your plan to mitigate. IF your plan is to fly as fragged, then YOU have accepted the risk, not TACC. If you deem the risk unreasonable, due to the factors contributing to your high ORM, then voice that opinion to TACC and fight to alter or slip your day. Its not rocket surgery, in fact it's actually the very definition of the program.

For once (and this doesn't happen often,) I'm actually on the side of "THE MAN" on this one. ACs need to have the balls to stand up for their ORM level and decision. More often than not, ACs will run the numbers and call for the approval, then hang up and joke/bitch about the approval they just asked for/received. In my experience, if I have an issue, say for example we are alerting on a 23.5 hour day after 12 hours sitting LFB, with dog-shit wx to an unfamiliar field with an inexperienced crew, TACC will give me approval if I ask for it. They will also be willing to flex if I provide an alternate plan, like delay for better wx, or build a crew rest en route. The last person calculating/signing the ORM is the AC. If the plan is stupid, raise the BS flag, and ORM is your tool.

[BitteEinBit]

"Signed off to high by TACC DO, have a safe flight", as mentioned before here nothing will change till they actually start using these tools.

All these "tools" are useless unless "leadership" (in some cases tools themselves) actually follow them.

Story time: Had an instance deployed where a tac airlift Bravo crew showed clearly fatigued for a mission in OIF because of the switch from days to nights on the flying schedule. Bravo crews were rarely used at the time, so sitting Bravo was like a day off, and generally AMD never launched them...regardless, for some reason the crew wasn't well rested. They all signed in maxing out the ORM for fatigue so it required OG or WG/CC approval. They were all still willing to fly, they just wanted to make it known that they were tired. OG said go. DO didn't want the crew to fly because they physically looked exhausted and this happened to be a high priority mission with a max duty day so, the DO said "nope ya'll aint going. " In other words, he exercised some leadership and judgment knowing that the crew had minimal sleep the night before for whatever reason. Information the OG/CC didn't care to ask about before just saying "go"

Anyway, DO calls AMD to recommend canceling the first line of the day (normally scheduled water pallet shuttle) to cover for the Bravo crew, which is exactly what AMD did. Word gets back to the OG and the DO got scolded, the original crew nearly got sent home, and...that's right...the ORM got changed so that you could max out fatigue on ORM and still be legal to go without OG or WG/CC approval. Basically the "leadership" didn't want to have to make a decision on a high priority mission that might make them look bad if it goes badly. That was the moment I realized we have been promoting the wrong people.

No one with any authority wants to make decisions anymore...it might make them look bad. They pass it to the lowest level so they can hang them when things don't go well. ORM shouldn't be used to try to get the lowest possible score so decisions can be made at the lowest level, but rather the highest potential score so you can identify ALL the risk and mitigate them if possible. If it requires senior leadership approval, then that should be your red flag. Yet, we pass off high-risk decision making to the lowest level relying on a pseudo 'experience' levels that may only exist on paper. Problem is we are running out of leadership above and experience at the execution level. Its ok though...we'll just keep blaming those at the lowest levels and the cycle will keep repeating itself...and we'll keep asking why and paying for more studies when the "why" is in our "leadership" or lack thereof.

Another J. Daniels rant...ya'll are doing a great job! Keep it up...blah blah blah.

It seems a ton of people are looking at ORM from the wrong vantage point. The ORM is your tool, not TACCs. ...If the plan is stupid, raise the BS flag, and ORM is your tool.

Exactly right pcola, the problem is "leadership" above still wants their fingers in the chili on this, but want to only blame the crew when shit goes badly. Sometimes there just isn't enough experience on a crew to make a well informed decision to call out TACC like you mention above. Some of our youngest go getters are just trying to stay looking good for "the man" so those school slots are still attainable.

What do you think really happens to the guys to alter the commander's priority 1 mission because they didn't feel safe completing it as fragged?

[JS]

....That was the moment I realized we have been promoting the wrong people.

You had your eyes wide shut until then and first realized this? I think I figured that one out quite a while back, way before we even went to war.

[addict]

A 2.5 degree glide-slope angle was the catalyst. One non-standard item that wasn't recognized in advance is all it took.

[sputnik]

A 2.5 degree glide-slope angle was the catalyst. One non-standard item that wasn't recognized in advance is all it took.

It's early and grumpy kids so my sarcasm detector may be inop--you're kidding right? It takes a little more than that to crash a plane

Pcola--I've quite happily been out of AMC world for a while. But when I was doing the field sobriety test/ORM sheet they already came down filled out from TACC. It made perfect sense to launch a crew at 0100 local from home station on a max duty day because hey, we had crew rest. So while in general I agree it's a tool crews can and should use...if we're going to pretend to have an ORM process they shouldn't build idiotic missions on a routine basis in the first place. It sends a message

My very first mission as an AC was a 0100 launch to a night AR, max duty day with a basic crew--copilot on 2nd mission and first time flying basic. Even with the relatively primitive ORM sheet we had back then my ORM came out fairly ludicrous--required Sq/Comm briefing/approval/risk mitigation. Which was conveniently already signed off with the thorough mitigation plan of "be safe."

Since then all I've seen in ORM is increasingly complex sheets requiring inputs by more and more people, I've yet to see any reduction in pointless risk. Only good thing I've seen is ambien. That really made a difference for me personally.

ORM is a great concept, one I've yet to see it enacted intelligently or usefully in AMC or AETC (heard rumors that AFSOC does it well--any truth?). For many of those missions the crew shouldn't have to say yes or no, planners/leadership should look at the mission and make the judgement that it's stupid long before it gets to a crew.

[HU&W]

ORM is a great concept, one I've yet to see it enacted intelligently or usefully in AMC or AETC (heard rumors that AFSOC does it well--any truth?). For many of those missions the crew shouldn't have to say yes or no, planners/leadership should look at the mission and make the judgement that it's stupid long before it gets to a crew.

The only thing better in AFSOC is that nobody abdicates their PIC authority to TACC.

[Trogdor]

I would say it is rather painless in AFSOC. However, in our community that seems to be changing. I have seen multiple changes that now require SQ/CC or OG/CC approval that use to be a none issue.... basically taking the decision authority out the hands of the AC. Also certian higher ups like to second guess how the AC fills out the ORM prior to stepping.... making sure the AC is doing it right or flight planning correctly. However, most leadership will back you if you pull the fatigue card, at least from what I have seen. So, that is good.

To me, it goes back to the shift of risk adverse leadership and making sure they have NO AC's that will do something stupid that will get them fired. I am not saying all are like that, but there seems to be more of that then there use to be.

[Day Man]

It's early and grumpy kids so my sarcasm detector may be inop--you're kidding right? It takes a little more than that to crash a plane

Don't worry about him...he's the resident instructor copilot.

[Azimuth]

Don't worry about him...he's the resident instructor copilot.

I thought that was you?

[addict]

Let's review from the article:

Things started to go wrong when the pilot became confused flying an instrument approach with a nonstandard glide path angle, the investigation found. The pilot tried to land at a standard 3-degree [glideslope], but the [glideslope] for the runway at Dover is 2.5 degrees.

At an altitude of approximately 300 feet, the pilot made a series of corrections, pulling the nose up to “an unusual attitude” to correct his approach and bringing the engines to idle

[sputnik]

Oh, you were serious. Wow

[addict]

Lament about ORM. It'll be 2 pages of fine print covering every possible mission detail. But the mission will change faster.

Stabilized approaches? It will be a page long in the v3 and be so imposing it will be a distraction and desensitize pilots from ever complying with the numerous criteria.

Try this:

Does AMC's upgrade program reek of stupidity?

Is there any mission that really requires stretching it out towards 24 hours?

The first two words of that article are: Crew Inexperience.

Edited December 7, 2013 by addict

[Day Man]

I thought that was you?

Good one, boom. Psst...your inferiority complex/jealousy is showing. Take your trolling elsewhere.

[tunes]

Let's review from the article:

Sounds like a failure in basic airmanship to me....

Its not like the 2.5% gs wasnt posted on the approach plate.......oh wait it is.

Edited December 7, 2013 by tunes

[sky_king]

So, I'm not an expert in the C-17, but I'm pretty sure that every pilot is taught ETCA in UPT.

Establish

Trim

Crosscheck

Adjust

So unless the glide slope is drastically different from the standard 3 degrees and has a crazy short final, I would think the "C" and "A" would take care of minor deviations. Straight up poor airmanship.

*break break*

ORM tools are ridiculous. Ours doesn't even include air refueling... you know, the most dangerous thing we do in the airplane.

[joe1234]

This is a rare flying-related rant, but here goes:

I honestly believe the problem with the ORM program is that most AC's simply lack the fortitude to push back against something that is unsafe and bullshit, because they are afraid that they will look bad in front of leadership. I always find it absolutely amazing how an AC, before a mission, can know that it's bullshit and dangerous, his crew all recognizes that it's bullshit and dangerous, and possibly one brave soul even voices their opinion that it is bullshit and dangerous. But the AC goes along with it anyway, because they gotta look good for the boss. Maybe they are pushing for a good follow on assignment, or a DP, or whatever the hell else.

The simple fact is that the PIC has the most power in this equation. People say don't let someone on the ground fly to your jet, but an AC who is too chickenshit to stand up to his superiors when he knows something is wrong, is doing exactly that. TACC will always push you to go and lean forward, because that is their job. Leadership will always do the same. Only the PIC can assess the situation on the ground and act as a check on the system. That's why we have officers in charge of those damn planes, the same way we have officers in charge of ships in the Navy that get a ton of command leeway. You are the master and commander of that fucking aircraft, so act like it.

[matmacwc]

ETAC, never heard of it.

Shuttup Joe, you make sense for once. At least we know you might be aligned with the heavy community.

[Cap-10]

Aim point

Airspeed

Cap-10

[HossHarris]

AoA!

[Day Man]

I didn't see in the article...was the AP coupled?

[Fuzz]

I didn't see in the article...was the AP coupled?

At an altitude of approximately 300 feet, the pilot made a series of corrections, pulling the nose up to “an unusual attitude” to correct his approach and bringing the engines to idle.

Looks to me like no, and he reverted to front side flying.

[Day Man]

Looks to me like no, and he reverted to front side flying.

I understand we don't need to bring privileged info out, but were you guys (62nd) briefed on this mishap?

Also, I'm not sure I understand the relevance of the glideslope...if they were relying on VASIs/PAPIs I kind of get it. What am I missing?

[Fuzz]

I understand we don't need to bring privileged info out, but were you guys (62nd) briefed on this mishap?

Also, I'm not sure I understand the relevance of the glideslope...if they were relying on VASIs/PAPIs I kind of get it. What am I missing?

Not to my knowledge.

As for you second question, API line set for 3.0 would be a steeper GS than the 2.5, so trying to line the API, FPV and PAPIs wouldn't work.