FUEL

This has peaked my interest as well, and I've attached what I believe is the current application guide (Dec 14). Says open to 11XX, 12XX, 13LX (CAS experts familiar with all components of fire support highly recommended). Minimums aren't too bad, but like CRO/STO the minimums aren't even close to what is expected. Searching through SOCNET, Shadowspear, and reddit they say shoot for 18 minute three mile, 2-2.5 hour 12 mile ruck, and 80+ pushups/situps. Probably 20+ strict pull-ups. I would guess the selection week is quite hellacious, and close if not similar to the CRO/STO phase 2 week if one is to be special tactics brethren attaching to 75th Ranger, SF ODA, SEAL team, etc. Link found via google search, can't find the source website that links it though. http://www.24sow.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jGrB2Lzgbxk%3D&portalid=1 Anyone have any numbers (selection rates), how common a non ALO (13LX) is selected, tour length? Special Operations ALO Application Package (current as of Dec 14).docx

This would be fine if there was, and the pilots planned, to be some type of career aviator. However, there is still pressure to make him/her an Aircraft Commander or Flight lead and give opportunity for follow on upgrades to make them competitive with their year group. I saw this particularly true in the MAF, I can't speak for the CAF (I assume they are better about not pushing an undeserved upgrade). However, late rates still have opportunity to reach command so it "shouldn't" be much different; on the other hand these late rates were top top guys to get selected late for UPT. I stand by my previous comment of 3-4 years out of "normal" flying is a hindrance not a help, despite how many AQ/ISIS/KG(insert other terrorist group) you have killed. If killing was a prerequisite for flying, then we would have your "not dead yet paratrooper" flying after his 82nd Airborne tour. Even if the UPT-Ds do go to a platform that performs CAS/DT, they'll be behind their peers (including FAIPs) in every other phase of flight and admin. Didn't they teach you thick skin in UPT? Keeping your hubris and attitude won't help you any either. A little off topic, I've noticed a lot of LT arrogance lately in the RPA world. My hypothesis is currently that since they don't start as a co-pilot or a wingman the SNAPness and cockiness can go unchecked.

I'm just spitballing here, but I think there may be a few considerations. A FAIP is still doing basic AF airmanship and teaching it (fundamentals of flying, pubs, comms, etc). Even with 4 years of heavy flying and an MC-12 mixed in there, I'm already losing some of those things. There are flghts, even months were some units don't even talk on a radio. For example, unless you do LR, you aren't going to have checked a real set of aircraft forms or beat up the traffic pattern; you take an IRC, but you'll never look at the -217 and remember how to hold in ICAO; I bet everyone here has been on 6-8 hr flights where you didn't even change the nav mission and just stared at the same dirt compound as yesterday. Some RPA guys might get really good in an airstack, relaying comms, and helping plan weapons effects; but there aren't a lot of follow on platforms that's going to help out unless you were a -38 guy going to a B-1 or a Toner guy that gets a rare AFSOC assignment. My advice, if you drop an RPA save up for an RV-4, split it with your buds and keep flying in normal airspace. If nothing else go do Launch and Recovery.

My argument (which could be wrong, I am assuming), is not the total logistics tail is smaller; we know, DCGS, LRE/MCE, Comm, MX, etc takes more than manned. Rather, where the logistics footprint is itself. In some cases I believe manned would require too large of a footprint too close to the area of interest to pull the same on station hours than our national security policy/strategy allows or is advantageous to our goals.

Not a pissing contest, I've pissed in/out of both in some, but obviously not all AORs. What I am saying is the pred/reaper loiter time carries an advantage of not putting boots on the ground where we don't want to show a large presence. I'm not saying light attack wouldn't fit some roles, and we can go back and forth naming missions it would be worse or better for. I don't think it would be good for long loiter for days and days of IMINT POL, and I think its a stretch to say its better to keep enough hardware in theater for manned ISR to do that too. Having constant surveillance and the ability to strike at any point during that is something RPAs bring to table, a lot. Not saying we do it better, but enable the US to do it a lot. I think I can name more, but a "place" is a subjective term. Parts of countries/AOR versus other parts may drive up this number, especially if the manned asset is in for a long commute as well and can't pull 24 hour coverage. This is the access piece I'm arguing, it may not be totally inaccessible just difficult to pull 24 hr coverage without a huge footprint or wasting a lot of manned ISR that could be used better elsewhere. I'm not sure how I see light attack sitting on the ground SAT radio waiting for the right time is good for the kill chain timeline in a DT situation. Not if assets on station have strike capabilities, . If its on call for doing armed overwatch/CAS in an IW/COIN environment, that is something its going to exponentially better than an RPA. My questions are how do we fit it in the inventory for that type of mission. Especially, when more of what we do is DT/counterterrorism and less and less counterinsurgency. How do you convince AFSOC or ACC to get the tenacity to fund it? Teach me how light attack can be argued for DT in counterterrorism over manned/unmanned ISR with strike capability in today's austere budget and I'll do it until my last dying breath. Bigger payloads is becoming more of an issue, so that is a start. Pragmatically, I see using it as AvFID as the easiest way to fight for it.

That was always how I read the ratio as well, however the article states otherwise... 1:5 equals "one year mobilzed in every five year period". So that leaves the question, when the NGAUS president says "a more realistic and attainable dwell-time ratio between deployments is used, such as 1:3" does he mean 1 gone 3 back, or 1 gone 2 back. The way the article is written implies the later. Flaco what do you believe 1:2 implies when referencing AD deployment rate.

I'm having a hard time looking at this from multiple vantage points. My initial is from a pilots perspective, where my civilian job would likely be in aviation (airline) and leaving the job would not necessarily put me behind in career advancement, seniority, job evaluations, etc. I'm may be completely wrong on this as I have no real background info. The other vantage point is the citizen-soldier who is trying to crush his civilian job as a manager, insurance salesman, engineer, etc. Can that person honestly have strong opportunities to excel if s/he is leaving for a year back for two (what they describe as 1:3), repeat? Is this accurate? I thought 1:1 dwell was gone 1 unit of measure and back for 1 unit measure. It says AD is set at 1:2, which means we're slated at 1 gone, 1 back?

Absolutely not, in my experience the MC-12 (and U-28) develop targets better by nature of the crew complement in the aircraft. Trying to translate that level of rapid communication in the RPA has been frustrating to say the least. Finishing isn't for discussion here, but having to bring in another aircraft isn't ideal for shortening the kill chain, but can definitely work just fine if something is on target with you. However, full spectrum target development/POL can be hard in 4 hour vuls and takes a lot of manpower/hardware compared to a 20 hr Pred mission. Not to mention manned might not be an option if there is a long transit required or in a place we don't have manned access period. My point was lower loiter times, burn concerns, logistics footprint and target access are likely negatives for an ISR/Light Attack blend (not all applicable to MC-12/U-28). Therefore, its hard to find a place for it in the inventory outside of AvFID (since we aren't giving a country RPAs) and, for a lack of a better term, IW/COIN CAS (which ACC has chosen not to bring the best solutions to the table, and AFSOC is sticking with gunships, not small planes).

Not getting too much into mission specifics, but with new AORs our squadron often doesn't have the manning to limit certain pilots to NSTR orbits/particular supported units and transit. It also isn't a way to develop said "talent," when there is limited time for training. Don't get me wrong, we do our best to put good pilots in the game when we know its playoff time... but the playoffs are becoming more and more random.

Completely agree, and I'm not sure why we don't. Maybe someone can shed some light on whether its a lack of training/trust on the RPA side to push for it or a lack of doctrinal fidelity by the higher ups. So yes, CAS procedures have been used in lieu of SCAR, DT, etc. What doesn't change is the fact quality persistent ISR leads up to most of those procedures. My point is today and tomorrow's environments have to deal with time sensitive targets that randomly present themselves in time, location and type (IW/CAS/DT/SCAR). The A-10 doesn't suit this most of the time and there are limited set of scenarios in which the bronco would as well. Admittedly, in those scenarios of lengthy armed overwatch the Bronco, or for that matter the IOMAX and Super Tacano, would do a much better job for cheaper. Especially if we can get our allied countries to buy and field them, even if we have to go through the painful process of teaching them. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/25/the-small-planes-with-big-missiles-the-u-s-wants-to-give-to-yemen/

Its not always about money. Persistence, reach-back, burn concern, and being places we don't want pilots are significant factors in platform selection as well. I'm obviously talking about ISR (what the Combatant Commanders are screaming for), not CAS. I understand the benefits of keep it simple stupid, and that the wide range of mission sets and acronyms that have been developed for them is doctrinally confusing. Gen Welsh harped on this in 2012: Trying to bring back the focus to core mission sets is great, especially from a PR standpoint and running with the narrative "only the Air Force can do what it does." However, keeping platforms in their own bubble of "designated" capabilities is not how we progress and the Predator wouldn't have a hellfire if we did. Mission sets blend as the kill chain shortens. Sure, the Bronco would be great and I'd rather fly it than be in a GCS, but it won't develop targets as well as the MQ-1/9. And if we want to finish those targets quickly, better to ensure the one that Finds/Fixes can also kill it. I think the Bronco would have a great roll in FID and COIN CAS, but ACC has decided it doesn't want a large stake in those mission sets and AFSOC has its own gray tail priorities. Plus, in AvFID, the country needs to buy their own planes to keep procurement fast and not have to deal with the foreign sales mess. That leaves CAS in a low threat, yet high CDE environment; for which ACC won't buy for exclusively or recognize is what "CAS" will be in the near future. In the name of simplicity the doctrine is holding us back, instead we really need some common sense.

I read the new "RPA talking points" the other day and all I saw was 30 "traditional" pilots being extended 1 year. I'm assuming that meant extend from return to manned flying, but I'll try and get them to post tomorrow. It was the cliff notes of "we have a problem"... "its big"... "here's what we're doing in the short term to fix this, but its not a long term solution"... words words words, sounds right, words words, but we don't believe it, word words, stop the paper before we have to talk about what we won't sacrifice (F-35, all desired future war capabilities... let's stop loss instead)

The argument is the WEZ is getting larger than the range of the strike aircraft. He lists 5 options to counter this, but one he doesn't list is pushing the range closer via low altitude AR. Someone that is smarter on radar stop my ignorant babble and provide help on this convo. The ability to terrain mask, curve of the earth, and no emitters, etc. could push tankers in closer, no? I believe this is part of the SOAR (spec ops AR) concept, but the theories aren't discussed at the crew training level much, maybe at the WIC level? Is this trained to on the AFSOC AR side of the house (MC-130P and MC-130J)?

In theory all the air to air comms of bandits/groups etc can be plotted and kept track of off the bullseye even in the tanker. And if it were real life, you bet your ass I'm keeping up and knowing what is getting close to my slide/scram trip numbers and who is or is not engaging so I know who is saving my ass. There is a training deficiency and a general malaise in the tanker community to understand air to air comms, and leaving my life and other's gas solely in the hands of the AWACS is not the best TTP. Obviously the better TTP would be dedicated CAPs for the HVAA. The authors the War on the Rocks article "Short Legs Can't Win Arms Races..." argues this point but as a means to get the gas in the threat environment since it is forever extending. Not sure this is a good idea (I'm sure there are much smarter opinions on the idea here), and neither is the author as he only says it needs deeper exploration.

I flew the tanker in 2 different Red Flags and 1 ME. The first RF (~4 years ago) the tankers were completely support aircraft for the exercise and no one wanted us to play. The second there was an attempt, but tankers didn't want to or know how to play since they never had--got shot down and a point was made but not really taken to heart. ME was obviously different with a handful a tanker patches trying to convince the crews that they were in for more than a Vegas vacation. Also shot down a few times, lots of failure points, but I'm not sure if the crews could keep up with the comms/threats if a Slide/Scram had even been called.